In a cruel and troubling irony, four United Nations peacekeeping troops were killed by Israeli firepower in Lebanon on the eve of the international conference in Rome called to consider a ceasefire and a new international force there. Little progress was made in Rome towards an immediate ceasefire because of profound differences on its desirability between Israel, Lebanon, Arab states, the US and European governments.
Yesterday was Israel's worst for casualties in the 16 days since the war began. This underlines the formidable military challenge it faces in defeating or decisively weakening Hizbullah, notwithstanding full US support for an extended campaign of killing and destruction. The Israeli defence forces expected to complete their operation in a much shorter time. Planning for it has been going on for several years. All the more reason to consider why it has taken so much time and devastation to get to this point. The rockets fired by Hizbullah from southern Lebanon are still hitting northern Israeli towns, confining most of the population there to bunkers. The deaths of 11 Israeli troops near Bint Jbeil yesterday indicate that a more substantial land invasion to prevent them entails much larger casualties, potentially eroding the undoubted public support the operation has had so far.
All armies tend to fight or avenge the last war. On this occasion the Israeli army has taken on more than it reckoned for. Hizbullah has many features in common with a conventional army, including tens of thousands of troops, high numbers of reserves and significant military prowess, technology and confidence. This makes talk of a "war on terror" more and more misleading. The movement is deeply embedded in Lebanese society and politically linked to states such as Syria and Iran. It gains credibility from the strength of its resistance to such an asymmetrical and destructive assault in the short and long term, more than it generates enemies. Thus the balance of power is shifting as between Hizbullah and the Israeli defence forces the longer the conflict lasts. The same applies to the balance between the movement's popular appeal in the Arab world and the authoritarian political leaderships of states which fear and oppose it.
The logic of war and diplomacy therefore poses a policy choice for all those dealing with this crisis. They must choose between defeating Hizbullah and its allies militarily or engaging with them politically. The dangerous and risky gamble made by US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice this week is that the first option remains open and desirable. The next 10 days will show whether this is feasible militarily and politically. That is increasingly doubtful, given the growing international hostility to such a maximalist strategy and the mounting fear that it could tip the region into a more generalised war. This can still be avoided if an immediate ceasefire is combined with an exchange of captives and prisoners and a determined effort to find an overall political settlement. Peace will be made between enemies, not friends.