Brinkmanship over United Nations arms inspections has once again toppled over into armed action by the United States and Britain against Iraq. Their cruise missile and air attacks are regrettable and legally questionable. But they were probably inevitable given Saddam Hussein's irresponsible failure once again to allow full freedom for UNSCOM to complete its work, as he undertook to do in February and November of this year in agreements with the UN Secretary General, Mr Kofi Annan. It is just as difficult to divine his motives as to assess whether President Clinton has used the crisis to delay or divert the impeachment vote against him in the House of Representatives. Taken together, their actions seem certain to prolong the sufferings of the Iraqi people by indefinitely postponing any lifting of sanctions.
Only last month Iraq headed off similar strikes by agreeing to reinstate the inspections at the very last minute. Since full adherence to them was a central condition set by Mr Annan in his skilful agreement in February, it is clear that this latest failure exposes Saddam Hussein's fear of compliance, or belief that intrusive inspection had successfully - and unacceptably to him - penetrated the regime's capacity to produce the biological and chemical weapons at issue in the standoff. The UNSCOM report is categorical and credible on this score. All this leaves critics of the US and Britain in a weak position to argue their case on the valid procedural grounds that it is not satisfactorily mandated by previous Security Council resolutions. Such action by the US and Britain sets a very bad precedent for other conflicts requiring international or UN involvement.
Mr Clinton and Mr Blair have done their best to articulate clear and limited aims for their military action - to degrade Iraq's capacity to produce chemical and biological weapons and to threaten its neighbours. It remains to be seen how effective these strikes will be in achieving these aims. Many of the Iraqi weapons systems are extremely difficult to locate and therefore to target, simply because they rely on very ordinary methods of production. It seems to be agreed that nuclear capacity is not at issue. In addition there is the running suspicion, articulated once again on this occasion despite the limited operational aims expressed, that the real preferred option of the US and British governments is to get rid of Saddam Hussein's regime. There is talk of supporting opposition to him and of keeping up pressure with sanctions.
But the opposition is mainly externally based, divided and weak, and has little credibility among ordinary Iraqis. They themselves are too poor, demoralised and fearful to mount internal opposition, which is all the more difficult to do in face of sanctions and now renewed military attacks. The regime has a vested interest in keeping the conflict going. There has to be some realistic prospect of reaching an end to sanctions and some kind of normalisation of Iraq's international relations before its people will develop the confidence or capacity to challenge President Saddam's rule. Unfortunately, any such prospect recedes as a result of this latest crisis. It is extraordinary in its timing, with the longstanding taboo on criticising US military actions when they are in progress broken by prominent Republican leaders in Congress. This adds quite a new dimension to the brinkmanship that has plagued US-Iraqi relations ever since the last Gulf War.