There are times, and this is one of them, when the most important word to understand in German foreign policy is “jein”. A cautious mix of ja and nein, jein foreign policy follows a clear pattern: nein, nein, nein, vielleicht (perhaps), ja.
Berlin's decision to send heavy arms to Ukraine, after two months insisting that it couldn't-wouldn't, is another major shift in German policy since Russia's war on Ukraine began in February. Three days after the invasion, chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a €100 billion fund to reverse years of underinvestment in the German military. A second promise to deliver aid to Ukraine, however, became bogged down since.
On Tuesday, the US invited its allies to Ramstein air base in southern Germany to discuss improving offers of assistance to Kyiv. As shakedowns go, it was remarkably effective. Hours before that gathering, after days of political pressure from his Green and Free Democrat (FDP) coalition officials, Scholz agreed that Germany could supply anti-aircraft tanks after all. More equipment is likely to follow.
Before he took office as chancellor, Scholz warned: "If you order leadership from me, you will get it". His "watershed" speech in February sounded like leadership, a break with the small-steps caution of Angela Merkel, often accused of doing the right thing at the wrong time.
Now he has ended his Merkel-like hesitation on supplying heavy arms to Ukraine, Russia's gas blockade to Poland and Bulgaria could force Scholz into another painful about-face on importing Russian energy. Suggestions that Germany has already made its choice – for its citizens' prosperity and against Ukrainians – is short-sighted and overlooks the inherently cautious, iterative nature of German foreign policy.
Rewriting the post-cold war rulebook on the fly, Scholz faces a task unlike any other European leader. With the shadows of two World Wars looming large behind, the German chancellor has to move forward, as sure as he can be that he is doing the right thing at the right time.