FOR 20 YEARS Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi served as Hosni Mubarak’s defence minister. On Mubarak’s overthrow and for the last 17 months Tantawi became Egypt’s de facto ruler as the head of Scaf (the Supreme Council of Armed Forces), the powerful military’s guarantor of its predominance in the transition to democracy. Or, some would say, its guarantor that the military’s dominance of Egypt’s politics for 60 years would not be threatened.
On Sunday, Egypt’s new president Mohamed Morsi retired Tantawi, the army chief of staff, Sami Hafez Enan and the leaders of the other services, a dramatic act of some political courage. Not only will it refresh the military’s tired leadership, but the move appears to represent an important shift in the country’s balance of forces, a powerful assertion of civilian supremacy, in which, so far, the military appears to have acquiesced. Morsi also reclaimed for himself political veto rights that the military had seized for itself in June when it suspended the new parliament.
His democratic coup has been broadly welcomed by Egypt’s democratic forces, although they contend that his accumulation of presidential powers now also needs to be checked. Specifically, Mohamed ElBaradei argues, by rebalancing the committee that is drafting a new constitution so that the Muslim Brotherhood’s domination is diluted. Its work, due to be completed by early September, will be put to a referendum, and within two months fresh parliamentary elections are due.
Crucially, Tantawi’s replacement, former head of military intelligence Abdel-Fatah el-Sissi, will report to Morsi not to Scaf, although the military retains significant power. The powerful National Defence Council, with its military majority, retains its right to make key decisions on security and related foreign policy issues.
Some critics are wondering aloud if Morsi and the brotherhood have actually done a secret deal with a younger cadre of discontented officers that will substantially preserve the military’s extensive economic and business privileges and its veto on sensitive foreign policy issues such as relations with Israel and Iran.
The sackings came in the wake of the killing of 16 border guards at a police station in the Sinai by Islamist militants and widespread criticism of the military leadership, shared within the army, over poor morale, lack of equipment and of preparedness. Morsi had responded strongly with an offensive in the Sinai which saw the unusual spectacle of a moderate Islamist cracking down on Islamist militants in collaboration with the Israelis.
Morsi’s move against the weakened leadership was tactically most timely. And his appointments as vice-president and justice minister of the two Mekky brothers has strengthened the impression that he is serious about putting the military in its place. The Mekkys are both highly respected independent judges not associated with the brotherhood, and expected to be willing to take on the military-dominated constitutional court. Time will tell, but his coup appears to reflect a real attempt to shift the tectonic plates of Egyptian politics.