Analysis of opinion polls and the referendum result suggests that at some point in late May, voters lost trust in the institutions promoting the treaty, writes Damian Loscher
THIS WEEK at the Gallup International Polling Conference in Madrid, Jean-Marc Leger, a Canadian political researcher, presented a paper on how his profession is adapting to the changing needs of US election strategists who increasingly look to research for competitive advantage. He highlighted the need for research to go beyond simply measuring opinion, to focus instead on understanding voter psychology and the underlying reasons behind voter behaviour.
Understanding the psychology of voting is important because motivations are often deep-rooted, so much so that voters are often unable or unwilling to talk about the issues that matter most to them or to tell researchers why they vote the way they do. Deeper motivations, because they are similar in character to emotions, are also extremely volatile.
A careful analysis of the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty should start with trying to look beyond the obvious to reasons below the surface, in an attempt to separate reasons for voting No from excuses for voting No.
Arguments made during the campaign about how the treaty would undermine our neutrality or would lead to tax harmonisation and the legalisation of abortion were tenuous at best. These arguments have been all too conveniently turned into reasons for voting No when in fact they are very often just excuses.
Neutrality, taxation and abortion are excuses because they ignore the subtle, but enormously significant, change in atmosphere that actually shaped the referendum result. They are excuses because they suggest the No campaign won when in reality the Yes campaign lost.
If you are in any doubt that the Yes campaign lost, consider the widespread anecdotal evidence that many No voters were apologists, shocked to find themselves on the same side of the fence as Sinn Féin.
TNS mrbi has been polling in Ireland on behalf of the EU since 2004. Consistently, this research has shown Ireland to be a strong supporter of Europe. It therefore came as no surprise that the Irish Times/TNS mrbi poll of January 25th, prior to Lisbon becoming a topic for public discussion, showed 26 per cent intending to vote for the treaty and only 10 per cent intending to vote against. As a nation we are naturally inclined to support membership of the EU.
The Irish Times/TNS mrbi poll published on May 16th, with just four weeks to go before polling, showed the Yes vote maintaining a comfortable lead. As expected, fewer voters were undecided than in January, but the indication was that both Yes and No campaigns were attracting an equal share of new voters.
By the time the final Irish Times/TNS mrbi poll was published on June 6th, the mood of the nation had changed. In just three weeks, the Yes vote had dropped five percentage points while the No vote jumped to 35 per cent, from only 18 per cent a few weeks earlier. No argument or combination of arguments is powerful enough to do this much damage in such a short space of time. Something much more fundamental in the voters' psyche must have changed.
Throughout the campaign, Irish Times/TNS mrbi polls could only find a small minority of voters that actually felt comfortable with their level of understanding of the treaty. Of itself, this should not matter. After all, we have all signed documents at one time or another that we did not read because we trusted the person presenting them to us. Critically, at some point in late May, voters lost trust in the institutions promoting the treaty.
When the Government and business leaders appeared themselves to be unfamiliar with the treaty, or could not explain how Ireland would benefit, voters became suspicious. And when appeals to vote Yes turned to threats, suspicion turned to resentment.
The electorate were being told what to do. Voters were spooked. Not that it would have taken much to spook them. They may not have been up to speed with the contents of the treaty, but they were all too aware that Ireland was the only country voting on Lisbon.
It has been reported that immigration was a key issue during the campaign and may have swung the vote. It is safe to say that immigration concerns will always be understated in surveys - it is not a topic people are comfortable discussing in public.
Understatement aside, our poll findings do not support the proposition that immigration grew in importance as an issue. In fact, it declined as a reason for voting No at the same time as the No vote climbed.
Immigration will also be used to explain why the working classes rejected Lisbon and the middle classes voted in favour, and to explain why the gap widened as the campaign progressed. However, TNS mrbi opinion polls confirmed that working-class voters were less comfortable with their level of understanding of the treaty when compared to middle-class voters. And the less voters knew the more likely they were to vote No.
Perhaps the social class divide was more about knowledge levels in relation to the treaty and less about immigration. If the treaty campaign played out as this article suggests, there are lessons to be learned for the Government and other supporters of the treaty.
Perhaps the most important learning is to go back to basics. When a politician knocks on a constituent's door, listens to his or her concerns and asks for their vote, what the politician is really doing is giving the impression of ceding control in order to win voter confidence. This relationship dynamic was entirely absent during the campaign. The Government did not want to listen.
The wisdom of politicians campaigning en masse for a Yes vote is also called into question by this analysis. Such a strategy may have invited an anti-establishment vote and may have served to polarise opinion, leaving no room for rational debate.
Faced with such an overwhelming show of force, it may have been difficult for voters not to feel they were being bullied. Politicians should have appealed directly to their own supporters, and employers to their employees. The message should have been "this is good for us" and not "this is good for everyone". Politicians should have asked for the vote, not told the public how to vote.
Where to next for the Lisbon Treaty, assuming we will be asked to vote again? Does it need surgery? If you subscribe to the view expressed in this article that neutrality, taxation and abortion were more excuses than they were reasons, concessions may need to be forthcoming, if only to demonstrate that Europe has listened.
Overt gestures of consultation, such as visits to Ireland by senior politicians, during which they meet voters and make a commitment to bring their concerns back to Brussels, could prove more effective in delivering reassurance and winning back voter confidence.
The question of just how far the European project should go was not a feature of the campaign initially, but somewhere along the way this elephant was let into the room. Talk of no commissioner and never having to consult the Irish public again began to gain traction. In our polls, a loss of power and identity as a claimed reason for voting No jumped in order of importance from fifth to second at the same time the No vote was surging. It could be this elephant that squashes the second Lisbon Treaty - if all we do is hope the elephant goes away.
Damian Loscher is managing director of TNS mrbi