A momentous change is taking place before our eyes in Britain's European and global role - and in its relationship with the United States.
The dominant feature of Britain's post-war relationship with its wartime US ally has hitherto been one of almost sycophantic support for the US, apparently in pursuit of a largely illusory special relationship.
There were, of course, a few occasions when a more independent British policy was momentarily pursued. One such attempt at independent action proved disastrous: the Suez debacle, when behind the back of a US which had not yet become ideologically engaged with Israel, Britain and France plotted with that country to invade Egypt and bring down President Nasser.
Twice Britain successfully intervened to influence US global policy: once, during the Korean War, towards peace, when Attlee persuaded Truman to sack Gen MacArthur, who was bent on a nuclear attack on North Korea's ally, China, and once towards war when, nine years ago, Margaret Thatcher seems to have stiffened Ronald Reagan's resolution as he hesitated on the action to be taken against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
These moments apart, Britain has been largely content to support and follow US policy closely and, until very recently, has opposed moves towards possible European defence arrangements. This has reflected a concern lest such a development might weaken links with the US through the North Atlantic alliance and NATO.
But British nuclear dependence on the US has been another important factor influencing its foreign and defence policy stances.
Mr Blair's support last year for the US renewal of the bombing of Iraq seemed to suggest that Britain's US-oriented foreign and defence policy would be continued under his administration. But his concern that Britain pursue a more positive policy towards European integration has since introduced a new dimension into the transatlantic equation, involving a revision of Britain's negative attitude towards European defence.
This negative stance has always seemed to go beyond the requirements of positive Anglo-US relations. US policy has always formally favoured European integration, believing that this might reduce the burdens and responsibilities that it has had to carry since the second World War because of the weakness of a divided western Europe.
It is true that if and when Europe actually came to take responsibility for its own defence, this move would be likely to pose some problems for the United States, and might even provoke a different kind of reaction, for the reorganisation of NATO towards this end could become a messy business.
SOME months ago Mr Blair reversed British policy on European defence, agreeing with the French at St Malo to work towards a European defence system by integrating the Western European Union in the European Union structure.
At the margin of King Hussein's funeral President Chirac and Mr Blair agreed that, given the endemic tensions in Franco-American relations, it would be for Mr Blair to secure US support for this move, and for consequential adjustments to NATO.
But now Tony Blair has gone much further - seizing the lead in the formulation of Western policy on Kosovo by committing Britain to securing, by the use of ground troops if necessary, the return of the Kosovan Albanian refugees to their own land.
Given, on the one hand, the doubts that exist about the possibility of negotiated settlement, and on the other hand the evident reluctance of the Americans to commit ground troops, Tuesday's German explicit refusal to do so, Italian reticence about the conflict and the outright opposition of public opinion in Greece, through which NATO forces have to move into Macedonia, this is a remarkably courageous stance for Mr Blair to have adopted.
He has put himself out on a limb, for unless there is a complete collapse of the Yugoslav forces there, the task of restoring the Kosovans to their land is almost certainly beyond the capacity of Britain on its own. And the unqualified nature of the commitment he has given may thus have placed him at the mercy of some very wobbly allies.
The truth is that his is a very high-risk gamble. On the one hand, if he is right in calculating that his partners in the Kosovan war will be forced by the logic of events to commit ground troops, and to do so in time to liberate Kosovo before the winter snows, he will emerge in an almost heroic light, having secured the unqualified moral leadership of Europe.
And in the light of the inglorious character of Britain's European record since the last war, that would be an astonishing achievement.
If, on the other hand, his partners do not match up to his expectations in terms of committing ground troops, he could be humiliated - although it can be argued that there is some honour in having tried and failed for reasons beyond one's own control.
Why has he taken such a huge risk?
No doubt ambition has played some part - the opportunity almost overnight to catapult Britain under his government into a European leadership role. But that alone is not, I believe, sufficient to explain taking a risk of this magnitude - especially as, by virtue of his firm control of power in Britain and the improbability of a French or German leader being able to compete in this respect in the foreseeable future, he already has an excellent chance of securing this European leadership role by a slower, but much surer, route.
It is thus difficult to avoid the conclusion that a key factor motivating his stance has been a moral one: a simple determination not to allow evil to prevail.
In international affairs decisions with major implications are normally carefully calculated; risks are avoided; and interests often take precedence over ideals. This may be one case where a leader has both the strength and the freedom of action, but also the will, to be guided in his actions by simple considerations of good and evil. Gladstone was such a man, and Tony Blair is known to admire Gladstone.
How does all this affect us in Ireland?
First of all, one cannot but be aware of the contrast between the scale of what is at stake in Kosovo and in Northern Ireland.
IN KOSOVO it is clear that thousands have already been massacred and the equivalent of Northern Ireland's population has been expelled from home and country. The issue involves war between states on a scale not seen in Europe for over half a century.
By contrast, what is now at stake in Northern Ireland is no more than an issue of timing; of political choreography; of who is to move first. To the resolution of this narrow timing issue, politicians of limited vision but unlimited, almost oriental, preoccupation with "saving face" by not conceding a crucial inch to each other, seem to expect Tony Blair to devote more of his time than to the life-and-death issues of several million Kosovans.
For us in this State there is a different moral issue. We can, justifiably, argue about the way in which NATO has handled this issue. We can legitimately criticise the operational competence of a military system that seems incapable of even buying an up-to-date street map of a capital city.
And we may even split legal hairs about military action taken without UN authority - although in all justice we can oppose such action only if we are willing to stand over the moral proposition that such legal considerations must take precedence over concern for mass ethnic cleansing and the massacre of men, women and children, all taking place within our own continent.
What we are not entitled to do is to pretend to each other and to the world outside that by opting out of this issue and steering clear of any involvement, we are in some way morally superior to those who are taking the kind of decisions that Tony Blair has taken. That is simply self-delusion and hypocrisy. And we demean ourselves if we pretend otherwise.