"We've looked for the constitution to be a national pact, and the perception now is that it's not." So said General George Casey, commander of United States forces in Iraq, to a congressional committee in Washington last week.
As Iraqis vote on the document today this fundamental shortcoming must be borne in mind. The referendum is needed much more to satisfy Washington's need for a political process with deadlines than to provide a definitive roadmap for Iraq's constitutional development. Any doubt about that was dispelled by this week's decision that the next Iraqi parliament will be able to amend the deeply flawed text, along with several other last-minute amendments designed to encourage Sunni voters to support it today.
Far from being a national pact the constitution fails to resolve basic issues about national unity, the role of Islam and the control of economic resources. More and more authoritative commentators and experts - including those on the neoconservative wing of US politics which vehemently promoted the war - say it is a recipe for breaking up Iraq, not holding it together. The constitution provides for a weak central government, gives regions rights to determine their own legal powers, installs Islamic law in a potentially oppressive fashion and fails to share equally the country's crucial oil resources. Many issues are left to future legislative action in a recipe for continuing political impasse.
The amendments accepted this week effectively postpone disagreements on these issues until after the next parliament is elected on December 15th. The new assembly will be able to revisit and renegotiate them. The calculation, strongly supported by US representatives, was to convince Sunni leaders they have more to gain from participation in the political process than from supporting continuing resistance to the US-led occupation. There has been a shift of view by one of the Sunni parties, as a result of which the constitution seems certain to be passed when the count is completed next week. But the continuing violence, the collapse of elementary order and security and the failure to restore public administration makes this a hollow exercise indeed.
If Iraq is to be saved from breaking up in a dangerous civil war it is essential that the efforts to create a genuine constitutional process be directly linked to a negotiated end to the occupation and a withdrawal of foreign troops. Occupation feeds the insurgents and prevents real politics from taking root. This will undoubtedly be a risky venture; but it is less so than maintaining the occupation indefinitely. It must be calibrated to Iraqi needs rather than to those of George Bush and Tony Blair, both of whom have lost public credibility and trust at home for their conduct of the war. Increasingly it is seen to have been a disastrous exercise, both in original concept and operation. There is now a common interest in the Middle East and elsewhere to find the political means to prevent the region being further destabilised.