HOPE is not lost yet on Northern Ireland. It is possible to get the IRA ceasefire back on track, probably on terms reasonably acceptable to the governments and the other parties. But negotiations could be tricky and would almost certainly require the help of the Americans.
In the last several days I have talked to several people in Sinn Fein, some of whom have been in a position to speak authoritatively on what would and would not be acceptable to the IRA. The situation seems more hopeful than I had previously perceived.
It was my view, based on initial discussion with Sinn Fein people, that a ceasefire could be reinstated provided there was a firm commitment on the part of the two governments to all party talks by a definite date without any preconditions. I argued in this column last week that, on this basis, the two governments should accept that although in reality such acceptance was unlikely.
But there is reason to believe the IRA position is softer than I had appreciated. I now understand it would be possible to sell the following deal to the IRA a renewal of "a complete cessation of military operations" in return for a firm commitment on all party talks conditional only on acceptance of the six principles outlined in the Mitchell commission report. Furthermore, that elections could be part of the package and that the "consent" issue would not pose problems ultimately.
I reported last week on a radio interview I had, with Martin McGuinness in which he refused to make the affirmation of the six principles that the Mitchell report recommends as a prerequisite to participation in all party talks.
In a radio interview on Monday last, the national chairman of Sinn Fein, Mitchel McLaughlin, repeated the fudge. But I have now reason to believe that if the net issue comes down to acceptance of the Mitchell principles, then that can be sold to the IRA.
In other words there will be a resumption of the IRA ceasefire if the two governments announce that
(a) all party talks will begin by, say, Easter
(b) these talks will go ahead irrespective of how many (or few) of the eligible parties show up, provided more than one such party show up
(c) that eligibility for participation shall depend only (i) on the winning of an electoral mandate in elections to be held by the end of March and (ii) unequivocal acceptance of the Mitchell principles.
This might not seem immediately attractive to many people because it might appear that the ensuing talks would take place under the threat of a resumption of violence. Many people will feel particularly uneasy both at the implied threat of a resumption of violence (implied because of what has happened with the breakdown of the ceasefire on Friday) and the refusal of Sinn Fein to accept the majority Forum report on the issue of consent the right of the people of Northern Ireland to themselves exercise self determination.
But such apprehensions might be allayed by looking at what precisely the IRA and Sinn Fein would be accepting by affirming the Mitchell principles.
Paragraph 20 of the Mitchell report states
We recommend that the parties to such [all party] negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment
"(a) To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues
"(b) To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations
"(c) To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission
"(d) To renounce for themselves and to oppose any effort by others, to use force to threaten to use force to influence the course of the outcome of all party negotiations
"(e) To agree to abide by the terms to any agreement reached in all party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree and
"(f) To urge that `punishment' killings and beatings stop ard to take effective steps to prevent such actions.
ACCEPTANCE of these principles is acceptance of a permanent ceasefire, which removes the threat of violence during the course of negotiations and which removes the threat of violence should the out come of such negotiations not be to the liking of Sinn Fein or the IRA, as inevitably it will not be.
It might be asked why, if acceptance of the principles amounts to a declaration of a permanent ceasefire, a permanent ceasefire cannot be declared openly. The answer appears to be the IRA will not declare a ceasefire in circumstances in which it believes the British might still renege on a promise to hold all party negotiations within a specific timeframe.
And it is in this context that the involvement of a credible intermediary, ideally Senator George Mitchell, is required. There is deep skepticism within the republican movement that the British want all party talks at all and that even if there is now a commitment to them an excuse will be found possibly some provocative "spin" on the Mitchell principles to procrastinate.
The only alternative to this strategy is a resumption of the "war" IRA atrocities, loyalist murders and brutal retaliation by the security forces in the hope either that the IRA can be defeated militarily in the short to medium term or that the IRA can be defeated in the long term. The long term scenario would involve an agreement among the governments and the "constitutional" parties which would marginalise Sinn Fein and the IRA and would lead ultimately to the defeat of republicanism.
The preferred option of both the main unionist parties and of many commentators and academics here is for the first of these two alternatives the military defeat of the IRA. These believe essentially that "the cancer of republicanism" can never be eradicated without inflicting such a defeat and the sooner the better.
But the price of such a military "victory" would be enormous in human terms. And politically it would involve necessarily the alienation of a sizeable section of the nationalist population and the possibility of a recurrence of violence in some future generation. Maybe the price would be somewhat less than I am supposing but there is at least the possibility that it would be as high as that.
As to the second of the available alternatives can we really await the long term to end violence and can anybody be sure that such long term violence would be ended?
Maybe the peace strategy won't work in the short or medium or long term. But surely, in the light of the horrendous cost that could be entailed with the only alternative strategies, it should and must be tried.