The United Nations has suffered a severe setback as a consequence of itsinability to prevent a war in Iraq, writes Jonathan Eyal
Even by the standards of its periodically troubled existence, the past week has been terrible for the United Nations organisation.
The week started with the decision by the US and its closest allies to abandon any hope of obtaining an explicit Security Council mandate for the war in Iraq. And it ended with the unleashing of the war itself, as the Security Council met again - forlornly - for a debate which everyone knew was irrelevant and at which every member-state repeated its well-rehearsed, predictable arguments.
The UN has suffered many shocks before and, no doubt, it will bounce back from its current predicament. But the drama which tore the Security Council apart will have an enduring impact in the attitude of the country which matters most for the future of this organisation: the United States itself.
To be sure, many of America's difficulties with the UN can be traced back to long before the current Iraq crisis. For the overwhelming majority of the world's states, the UN remains a necessity, an organisation which enhances their influence, provides a platform and ensures a measure of fairness and predictability in international affairs.
Many governments are well aware of the UN's shortcomings, such as a top-heavy bureaucracy, the sometimes inefficient and occasionally negligent spending practices, or the perennial barter which accompanies any decision. Nevertheless, the conclusion of most of the world is that such problems can either be tackled or simply tolerated, for the advantages which the UN brings far outweigh such niggling difficulties.
For America, however, the UN is seen as a luxury, a tool which may be good occasionally, but which should not be allowed to restrict the world's only remaining superpower.
Right from the start of the current crisis, Washington had made it abundantly clear that, although it would have preferred to have a solid international mandate, it also reserved its right to start hostilities in Iraq regardless of what happened at the UN. This position may seem outrageous. But, as viewed from Washington, it represents the norm, rather than the exception: after all, in the last decade alone, the US ignored resolutions it did not like, and it has frequently arbitrarily reinterpreted many others.
It is usually forgotten that, when communism collapsed more than a decade ago, the US was briefly seized by the fervour of a "new world order", with the United Nations at its core. The backing of the UN for the first Gulf War in 1991 boosted this trend; Washington was also one of the leading participants in the discussions about the internal reform of the organisation, and even went as far as to commit US troops to peacekeeping operations.
In reality, Washington itself never truly believed that the UN could be a permanently useful organisation. Talk of a "new world order" quickly gave way to bilateral arrangements with key countries in every region, while the United Nations was left to deal with matters which the US considered both unimportant and intractable.
The organisation became bogged down in a myriad of African tribal conflicts, a necessary but thankless task, and not one which increased its reputation. When it did record a few successes - East Timor, Cambodia or the Balkans - these usually came at the end of a chain of events to which the organisation contributed very little or, like in the Balkans, only after the US unilaterally imposed a solution with its own armed forces. The love affair between the UN and the US was consequently very brief.
However, the end of the Cold War added a new dimension. Countries such as Russia, France and Britain clung even more fervently to their permanent membership status, just as the US began to regard them as ordinary states, much diminished in importance. And a welter of new obligations - such as the creation of an International Criminal Court - emanated from the UN, despite the certainty that the US would never ratify them.
Keeping America actively engaged in the organisation requires some self-restraint, a fact Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General, never forgot, but a basic principle which quite a few governments chose to ignore. The consequence is the current diplomatic disaster over Iraq.
Although few other capitals realised it, Washington made what it saw as a genuine concession when it chose to go to the UN to seek a mandate for its Iraq operation.
The decision represented a victory for Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, against the hawkish members of the US administration, who have argued all along that the UN route would simply waste time and produce no results. Powell prevailed, but ultimately failed to deliver.
After a month of anguished diplomacy, a resolution was adopted last November, yet the Americans, who believed that this represented the mandate they needed (and who, incidentally, were privately assured by even the French and the Russians that this was the case), quickly discovered that the resolution merely served as a prelude to a seemingly interminable UN inspection effort as well as leading to demands for yet another Security Council vote.
Secretary of State Powell prevailed once more over his colleagues in Washington and tried to go for another resolution. He failed again, and this time spectacularly.
The French may feel satisfied with their leadership of the anti-American group in the Security Council. Yet what they have ultimately achieved is the political destruction of the one American senior politician who was prepared to give the UN a chance. If the war in Iraq goes well, Colin Powell will be regarded as yesterday's man. But, even if the war goes badly, the US Secretary of State will not recover from the current blow.
It is a lesson which future US politicians are unlikely to forget: opting for the UN route may be dangerous not only for America's interests, but also for one's own career prospects. From the viewpoint of the New York-based organisation, a worse outcome can hardly be imagined.
Of course, the UN will recover its poise. After all, President Bush himself claims that the current conflict is in the name of Security Council resolutions.
Nevertheless, the bruises will linger for years. As one of America's leading commentators wrote recently: "The UN is not a good idea badly implemented; it is a bad idea."
Many people around the world would disagree. But, unfortunately, few of those who disagree are US citizens.
Jonathan Eyal is Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London