Irish neutrality during second World War

Offers of unity

Sir, – Stephen Collins (Opinion & Analysis, February 3rd) made telling criticisms of the Irish policy of neutrality during the second World War.

Another point to make is that in maintaining this policy of neutrality taoiseach Éamon de Valera and the Irish government let pass the best opportunity to unite Ireland in the last 100 years.

In the early years of the war the British government offered on two occasions to the Irish government a united Ireland in return for southern Ireland joining the Allied war effort against Nazi Germany. Both offers were turned down.

In 1938, the British government had handed over the crucial Treaty ports to the Irish government.

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By 1940, with full retreat from continental Europe and a critical need to defend the sea routes to the US, the UK desperately needed Irish support in the war effort.

As Paul Bew has noted, on June 28th, 1940, the British prime minister Neville Chamberlain conveyed to de Valera an offer of Irish political unity in return for full military co-operation. This came to nothing.

On December 8th, 1941, Sir John Maffey, the British representative, delivered a special message to de Valera from the new British prime minister, Winston Churchill, again offering Irish unity in return for Irish support against Hitler.

Once more this was rejected.

These plans to end partition had been conveyed to the Northern Ireland cabinet to the shock and anger of the prime minister Lord Craigavon and later JM Andrews. However, there were others who were open to such proposals.

This was especially the case with cabinet member, Sir Basil Brooke, later Lord Brookeborough and prime minister of Northern Ireland. He was a nephew of Gen Alan Brooke, chief of the Imperial general staff and the top professional British soldier from 1941. He lost two sons on active service during the war. Initially he was opposed to any idea of unity with the south but with the deteriorating military situation he came to adopt a new attitude.

His son John Brooke later recalled a conversation with his father one day in June 1940 on this subject. He said his father regarded western civilisation as of greater worth than anything else, being absolutely convinced of the menace of Nazi Germany. His son concluded: “It was my opinion that day that in those circumstances he would have to do his best to secure Irish unity”.

How far Brooke’s position would have found other support is not clear. In the event, the matter was never put to the test, as both proposals from the British government were rejected by de Valera and the Irish government.

It seems that their refusal to go along with these proposals was influenced in part by concern over possible violent IRA objections.

At the same time, it is clear that they were unwilling to meet the challenge of accommodating over 800,000 northern unionists in the Irish state.

As we see today in the findings of recent opinion polls, many who advocate a united Ireland are not prepared to accept the changes that would be necessary in such a scenario.

Of course, Northern Ireland played a very important part in the Allied war effort. In gratitude for this, and after the south declared a republic, Westminster passed the Ireland Act of 1949, which affirmed that in no event would Northern Ireland cease to be part of the UK “without the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland”.

Both sides were happy with the final outcome. Brooke won a strengthened union with Britain and de Valera was able to continue with his denunciation of partition. – Yours, etc,

Prof Emeritus

BRIAN M WALKER,

Belfast.