Sir, - The febrile atmosphere surrounding the last days of the Stormont negotiations seems to have had a strange effect on at least two commentators who might previously have been thought sympathetic to the position of the broad unionist community in Northern Ireland. I refer to Fintan O'Toole's article "Unionists unable to accept prize that lies within their grasp" (July 2nd) and Manus O'Riordan's letter (July 8th).
Fintan O'Toole makes three assertions which in his view form an unchallengeable case for David Trimble agreeing to enter an executive with Sinn Fein before decommissioning. The first, that "the political geometry is not going to get much better for unionists than it is now", since Tony Blair will be in power for the foreseeable future, is highly questionable but need not concern us here.
The second, that "the IRA accepting a commitment to decommission its arms by next April represents an epic moment in the history of Irish republicanism, a genuine point of no return", would be true if its first part contained any reality, but where is the evidence for it? When the smoke and mirrors of July 3rd had disappeared, what exactly was the "seismic shift" in the Sinn Fein position which Mr Blair alleged had occurred? It consisted only of a slight firming up of the commitment already made by Sinn Fein in the Belfast Agreement to "use any influence they may have" to achieve decommissioning. All the old double-talk and caveats were still there.
Fintan O'Toole's third assertion is that, if the Executive is formed and later collapses because of IRA failure to decommission, "the unionists will have the Irish, British and American governments on their side for the first time". If he means by this that the governments will act to exclude Sinn Fein until the IRA decommissions, he should think again. On the experience of events since the first IRA ceasefire, it is far more likely that the "process" will simply enter another turn of a familiar cycle.
This cycle broadly consists of the following: the unionists start with a given position (originally "no guns, no talks"); Sinn Fein bends the ears of the governments while the IRA says nothing; the governments pressurise the unionists to engage with Sinn Fein so as "not to let this historic chance for peace slip from our grasp", etc. Sinn Fein spokespersons, pressed on decommissioning, darkly mutter that we should be grateful the guns are silent; Gerry Adams lectures all parties about their responsibilities; Mary Holland writes six columns, three of which present the republican case, three the unionist; the IRA issues a statement indicating no change in its position; this sends commentators, especially those of a constitutional nationalist persuasion, into a flurry of interpretation as they try to cast the intentions of the faceless "Army Council" in an optimistic light; the Southern and British populations, ever eager for good news from the North, willingly accept the spin; the unionists are castigated on all sides for blocking progress by being too cowardly/too stupid/too attached to their former superiority; finally the unionists shift to a new position (e.g. "guns during the talks") and the cycle begins again.
For Manus O'Riordan, David Trimble's reluctance to "engage with the courage and heroism" of the Sinn Fein leadership amounts to "sabotage" of the Good Friday Agreement. This is a rather extreme conclusion. Surely these virtues alone are not enough? Assuming the leadership's intentions are genuine, they may be engaged in an impossible task. Unionists should not be asked to enter government with Sinn Fein leaders who think they "might" be able to persuade their private army to disarm. - Yours, etc.
Dermot Meleady, Dublin 3.