The British dossier on Iraq's development of weapons of mass destructiondoes not contain any new military information and is more significant interms of its tone and timing, writes Tom Clonan.
The British government yesterday published its long-awaited dossier on Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The much-hyped dossier is more significant in terms of its tone and timing than in its actual content.
Although it was prepared by the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) consisting of the heads of Britain's intelligence and security agencies and the chief of Defence Intelligence this is not a military intelligence document. It does not conform to the spartan format of a military or intelligence document.
This is a discursive document, which in terms of rhetoric and presentation has been carefully prepared for a civilian audience.
The primary objective would appear to be to persuade a reluctant civilian audience, including the House of Commons, that nothing short of an invasion is required to deal with Saddam Hussein and the current Iraqi regime.
In terms of style, the document abandons the abbreviated and clinical mode of address normally associated with the military and intelligence community. Instead, it favours an emotive and often moralistic approach to drive home its message about the dangers posed by Saddam's regime.
For example, in a section referring to Saddam's chemical weapons attack on the village of Halabja in 1988, a photograph of scattered corpses is inserted into the text. In the context of a purportedly detached and objective dossier, the inclusion of such an image resembles an exploitative dramatic device.
Overall, the tenor of the document is designed to evoke an emotional response on the part of the reader. This emotional response is no doubt presumed to be a powerful factor in securing the necessary approval for an invasion of Iraq.
In terms of content, the document contains little information not already in the public domain. However, the facts outlined remain sobering.
The document highlights the final reports of the Unscom weapons inspection teams to the UN Security Council in 1999.
In terms of Iraq's chemical weapons programme, Unscom reported at the time that the Iraqis retained at least 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent including nerve agents such as sarin, tabun and VX gas.
In terms of Saddam's biological weapons programme, Unscom concluded that the Iraqis had in their possession substances for the production of over 25,500 litres of anthrax spores.
In addition, the document states that the Iraqis possess over 30,000 dedicated munitions (artillery shells, free fall bombs and missiles) capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons beyond their borders.
In terms of Saddam's nuclear weapons programme, the document refers repeatedly to the findings of Unscom weapons inspectors.
These indicated that the Iraqis were attempting to perfect the latest technologies for enriching uranium for use in nuclear weapons. The current dossier alleges that the Iraqis are continuing apace with these developments.
Significantly, the document cites British intelligence sources that claim the Iraqis have made several attempts recently to acquire uranium from Africa. The document concludes that at the present rate of advance, the Iraqis will have acquired a viable nuclear weapon within two years.
A disturbing aspect of the dossier centres on Saddam's ballistic missile programmes.
The Unscom inspection teams and British intelligence sources indicate that the Iraqis have retained approximately 20 al-Hussein ballistic missiles with a range of up to 650km. This is in clear breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687 and would place many of Saddam's neighbours, including Israel, within immediate reach of his chemical and biological weapons.
The dossier also contains a great deal of data on Iraqi attempts to develop the al-Abbas and Badr-2000 ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 1,000km and 2,000km respectively. With the capability to carry biological or chemical agents, this would place Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Israel well within range of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction.
In summary, there are two key points contained within the dossier. The first is the assertion that "Iraq is preparing plans to conceal these weapons including documentation from renewed inspections".
This claim would suggest that international calls for a renewal of inspection teams would have a negligible effect on Saddam's WMD programmes.
The second key point is concerned with the imminent threat posed by Saddam. The document states that, with their current missile arsenal, the Iraqis are "capable of reaching the UK sovereign base areas in Cyprus and NATO members (Greece and Turkey) as well as all Iraq's Gulf neighbours and Israel". This is clearly the "serious" and "current" threat that Tony Blair speaks of in his introduction to the dossier. It is precisely this threat to British bases and NATO allies that the British Prime Minister hopes will galvanise support for an invasion of Iraq.
The dossier does not contain any new information. It simply provides timely and emotive support for President Bush's and Mr Blair's mutually shared belief that an invasion of Iraq is necessary to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction.
Dr Tom Clonan is a retired Army officer with experience in the Middle East and former Yugoslavia. He is a fellow of the US based Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He currently lectures in the School of Media, DIT