Worldview/Paul Gillespie: The murder of Anna Lindh, Sweden's Foreign Minister, just days before tomorrow's referendum there on joining the euro, is a sharp reminder of how interconnected and interdependent national, European and world politics have become.
She exemplified the creation of a functioning political identity at European level towards the rest of the world, while in Sweden she represented the more cosmopolitan side of its social democratic and left-wing movements, which remain deeply split about the EU and the single currency.
The tributes to her from her fellow ministers and political leaders in the European Union crossed the divide between domestic and foreign affairs that is more deeply etched in Sweden's political culture than elsewherre in the EU.
As the Prime Minister, Goran Persson, put it, "Sweden has lost its face towards the world". Pat Cox told RTÉ: "She represented for me very much the acceptable face of modern European politics. She is a huge loss." Brian Cowen spoke of her "warm personality, a good dense of humour, an incisive intelligence and a commitment to decent values".
He recalled conversations with her at the informal meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in Italy last weekend, while Ruairí Quinn said she was a good friend of Ireland, who had delivered an important speech recently at the Institute of European Affairs in Dublin. She was a sharp critic of George Bush's "lone ranger" policies but remained on good terms with Colin Powell, who said there were three things he liked about Sweden - Abba, Volvo and Anna. Why was she only third? Lindh asked.
Several cleavages run through Swedish politics concerning its EU membership, agreed in a 1994 referendum by a margin of 53-47 per cent. There is a big divide between political, cultural and economic elites, most of whom favour joining the euro, and people at the base of public and private organisations who oppose it.
Urban and rural opinion is similarly divided, as are the northern and southern parts of the country. Women are markedly more sceptical than men. Within the trade union movement there are similar divisions; but on this occasion the trade union congress is neutral.
Sweden's welfare state is based on a historic compromise between labour and capital in the 1930s, reached after decades of conflict between them during the period of industrialisation from the early 1900s.
Many of the world class companies on which its industrial reputation and international trade rest were set up then. In return for a high level of labour market flexibility they were willing to trade off social protection based on high taxation and strong public involvement in providing employment.
The formula has survived many vicissitudes, having created an equilibrium which balanced conflicting interests. Sweden's neutrality reflected that equilibrium at the level of state sovereignty, creating what many of its citizens regarded, and still regard, as a golden age of prosperity, development and full employment from the 1950s to the 1980s.
Sweden's membership of the EU and now of the euro are necessary to maintain that equilibrium between international competitiveness, business efficiency and social protection in changed international circumstances, according to their supporters.
Opponents say rather that joining the EU disrupted them and that euro membership would make things worse.
State sovereignty becomes a central issue in this argument. Globalisation and reinforced economic interdependence necessitate pooling sovereignty within the EU so as to control, influence and govern these forces, according to the Yes side.
The No side says that is a step too far, which sacrifices domestic control.
The argument is complicated by predictions made in the mid-1990s about the likely effects of joining the EU on jobs, investment and inflation, which were oversold by its supporters.
Employment strains and economic turbulence arising from globalisation were blamed on the EU, so that there were polling majorities against the EU soon after the 1994 referendum.
This popular scepticism has constrained Sweden's leaders since then. On this occasion similar arguments about the euro's economic effects have surfaced. The referendum's timing has not helped, since it coincides with efforts by large states such as Germany and France to wriggle out of their budgetary obligations, raising the suspicion that the euro is a power system in which their interests predominate.
There are also fears that tax harmonisation within the euro zone would force Sweden to scale down its welfare state, creating more unemployment among lower-paid public servants, many of them women.
Anna Lindh was an effective campaigner across these divides. An enthusiastic supporter of euro membership, she had a credibility that seemed to transcend the deep gap between establishment and popular politics. She was a visible and attractive representative of cosmopolitan Sweden capable of engaging fully with its more nationalist and eurosceptic sectors.
Her personal background as a lawyer and the daughter of an artist and teacher who had risen through the ranks of the Social Democrats, enhanced that credibility, although the point is made that she did not have very close relations with the trade union movement.
How Sweden votes will affect opinion elsewhere in Europe, notably in Denmark, which could have another euro referendum soon if the Swedes vote Yes, and in Britain, where a referendum before the next election would be even more unlikely if the Swedes vote No.
Norwegian opinion, swinging towards joining the EU last year, is now receding and would also be affected by how Sweden votes. So, too, could be opinion in Latvia, voting soon on EU accession. Estonia, votes today.
Political research shows most identifications throughout the EU takes the form "country first, but Europe, too". The real cleavage in mass opinion is between those who identify only with their nation and those who see themselves attached to both.
Individual willingness to support further integration increases quite dramatically from the former to the latter group, which has itself been increasing systematically through the 1990s.
Eurobarometer surveys show that 94 per cent of top decision-makers consider membership of the EU to be a "good thing", 2 per cent a "bad thing" and 4 per cent neither of these, compared to the general public where the comparable figures were 48, 15 and 28 per cent.
Sweden is at one end of these ranges of opinion in the EU, and how it votes will affect the balances elsewhere, as well as the political momentum towards deeper integration. Anna Lindh's murder could tip that balance.