WorldView: On hearing I was off to speak on a panel about Nicolas Sarkozy's first six months as president of France a colleague inquired whether I was for him or against him.
This may not be the best way to approach Sarkozy, since he is notoriously omnipresent with an undeniable five-year electoral mandate for change. We need to know rather whether he is likely to succeed or fail and in what spheres and sectors; whether he is playing a short or a long political game; whether there is more rupture than continuity in his programme; whether he and his party can govern alone or need allies; and how far pragmatism and his apparent psychological need to be liked will determine his exercise of power.
Sarkozy's ubiquity is well illustrated by this week's events. He flew to Chad to negotiate the release of seven French and Spanish nationals involved in a controversy about allegedly abandoned children being brought to France. He went to Brittany to offer striking fishermen a compensation scheme for rising diesel prices. He travelled to Washington to meet George Bush and address a joint session of Congress, which gave him a standing ovation.
And he returns home to face a month of industrial conflict over pension cuts for rail, subway and energy workers. They will be joined by teachers fighting jobs cuts in the public service, students protesting about plans to give universities more autonomy and link them more closely to the private sector, and by legal personnel complaining about changes in the courts service.
Sarkozy's supposed omnipotence will be sorely tested by these industrial disputes, from which attention cannot be diverted by headline-grabbing foreign missions. They remind all concerned of the strike wave in 1995 that upended the similar Chirac/Juppé reform programme, leading, as Sarkozy sees it, to a decade of torpor in which France's debt-ridden and sluggish economy failed to adapt to a changing world. In 2006 another strike wave stopped Dominique de Villepin's comparable efforts.
Above all, Sarkozy has put work at the centre of his political platform. His government's key policy objective is to improve France's international economic competitiveness and thereby reduce its comparatively high unemployment. Hence his first round of reforms in June and July lifted tax on overtime in the 35-hour week; abolished inheritance tax; introduced incentives to earn, buy and own property and save; and brought in proposals to make universities more competitive.
This month's further round of change is intended to consolidate those measures. While some of them have been watered down, Sarkozy insisted in Washington this week he will see the conflicts through: ". . .I will hold firm, not because I'm stubborn, but because it's in France's interest. I was elected to do difficult things and I will do them".
Associated directly with this priority is an assertion of the values surrounding work, as expressed in his victory speech on May 6th: "The French have spoken. They have chosen to break with the ideas, habits and behaviours of the past. I want to rehabilitate work, authority, morality, respect, and merit. I want to honour the nation and national identity."
He is therefore determined to force a rupture with the 1968 generation of left-wingers he blames for holding France back. Mischievously invoking the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci's writings on hegemony against them, he says power has to be won also in the sphere of ideas and values, because "the ideological victory always comes before the electoral one".
This conviction explains much about his hyperactivity. By transforming public discourse he hopes to facilitate that rupture, rallying support for whatever social confrontations are necessary. He has also absorbed some of Gramsci's ideas on strategic alliances. The French electoral system requires this, as was shown by the failure of the centrist François Bayrou's new party to make an impact in June's parliamentary elections, notwithstanding his strong 18.55 per cent showing in the first presidential round.
Sarkozy shifted to the right during the presidential campaign by absorbing some of Jean-Marie Le Pen's political programme and capturing many of its votes. The election restored the right-left axis of French politics, while its 85 per cent turnout confirmed the new public engagement with politics shown in the 2005 EU referendum. His high poll standing remains in place so far. As Robert Elgie, a French specialist in Dublin City University, pointed out at this meeting of the Trinity College politics society, Sarkozy needs 50 per cent of votes to win another election in 2012 - and 2017? - and is certainly playing a long game to get them.
After his victory, Sarkozy went further by co-opting leading figures from the Socialist opposition. The 19th century American word "discombobulate" comes to mind as an appropriate description of how this strategy has affected the Socialists. Combining "decompose" and "discomfit", it has disturbed, upset, disconcerted and embarrassed them. By appropriating several of their social democratic luminaries even at the cost of annoying some of his own supporters, Sarkozy has built a broader alliance with which to confront the far left activists leading many of these industrial struggles.
He must come through this month victoriously if his longer-term project is to succeed - and he is well prepared for the confrontation, which will probably be resolved through elaborate compromises in keeping with his pragmatic streak. Whether that will prepare the ground for resumed economic growth remains to be seen. It is currently running at less than 2 per cent, compared to his expected 2.5-3 per cent, and the state budget deficit is still widening.
Sarkozy hopes to stimulate economic measures at European level during his EU presidency from July next year. In Washington he upbraided the Bush administration for echoing John Connally's remark in 1974 - that "the dollar is our currency and your problem" - by calling for a more co-operative management of euro-dollar exchange rates. He thereby acknowledged how dependent he is on international economic trends if he is to succeed.
In sum, Sarkozy has certainly highlighted his agenda for change but has yet to deliver on it. His activism makes him personally vulnerable to any conspicuous failure in meeting these raised expectations in the short term, when a longer haul is required. It may also disenchant his cabinet. Continuity and pragmatism are revealed in his handling of institutional and constitutional changes. And his centralist instincts sit uneasily with his liberal economics - but is that not a characteristic French tension?