Does the Bush visit to London prove the "special relationship" with Blair is still intact, and what does it mean for Europe? asks Ben Tonra
The message from London is clear; Britain is the linchpin of the transatlantic alliance. Only London, so the argument goes, has real credibility in Washington, a credibility that is born of true allied commitment and that has been tested and tempered in battle.
George W. Bush, we are told, listens to Tony Blair and takes his cue from Blair in matters European. From the European perspective, this means that Blair is a powerful interlocutor and that what sells in London can be sold to Washington. Nice story, but is it true? If not, whither European-US relations in the alleged era of the "hyperpower"?
In Washington it would indeed appear as though the political circles around President Bush value the role that Britain plays in the world. It is a role that sustains and supports US global leadership and gives necessary credibility to Washington's claims of multilateral support.
The difficulty rests in translating the political capital so generated into real influence over the Bush administration, and here there are substantial difficulties.
The first is that Britain is not the only European state playing the "Washington Card". Spain, Poland, Italy, Denmark and many others are equally determined to underscore their own "special relationship" with the United States and thereby give substance to the picture of an emerging "new" Atlantic-centred Europe.
While such voices only rarely break through the wall of Anglophone journalism, an even cursory glance through the continental press will remind you that Prime Ministers Aznar, Miller and Berlusconi et al are all equally steadfast Atlantic allies making their own contributions to US foreign policy. While Britain may indeed occupy a place of note within this US-oriented coalition, it is not unique.
The second point to bear in mind is that current US policy should not be confused with US national interests. Those who protested against President George W. Bush in Trafalgar Square are outnumbered by a factor of many hundreds by those in the United States who are also opposed to the unilateral cast of Bush's foreign policy.
Opinion polls in the US, the statements of Democratic presidential hopefuls and a significant number - if not the majority - of US foreign policy commentators would argue that this administration's approach to foreign policy is at odds with much of the US political mainstream and counter to the main thrust of US foreign policy since the first World War.
The third point is the realisation that, to date, there is nothing the present British government can point to as representing the fruit of their special relationship. On a range of issues where the European consensus (including Britain) is at odds with US policy, there is as yet no evidence of a "Blair effect".
Consider the steel sanctions ruled illegal by the WTO, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto protocol, the creation of a European military headquarters, the status of US-held prisoners at Guantanamo Bay or the Middle East peace "road map". In no instance has the US visibly budged in response to British lobbying.
The only evidence proffered by sympathetic US and British sources is counterfactual; that is, what might Bush have done without the steadying, multilateral hand of Blair at his shoulder? By its nature impossible to disprove, this argument is at least dubious.
Its only real test came during the struggle for UN authorisation of the Iraq war. When British sources suggested that a second resolution might be a precondition for their participation, the US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, immediately - and very publicly - made it clear that US war plans could proceed without the British. Explanatory statements and reassurances were swiftly issued on both sides, but the point was made: the British were welcome but not necessary.
The former British foreign secretary, Robin Cook, asked this week in a column for the London Independent how we might test the assertion of British influence flowing from Blair's commitment to the US. What could be a fairer test, he argued than ". . . whether before President Bush takes off on Friday we have secured agreement on an agenda in which progress is as much in the interest of the US as Britain?" By that reasonable yardstick, the extent of British influence is either marginal or mythological.
What then does this suggest for US-European relations more broadly? The core message must be that the political/security relationship is so unbalanced as to require fundamental re-engineering.
So long as some European prime ministers vie with one another for approbation in Washington and try to outdo one another in their bilateral fealty, the Bush administration will be free to play one national capital off another or, in the words of one senior adviser, to "cherry pick" allies as circumstances demand.
The fact that the US National Security Adviser would think it reasonable to advise that the US should "punish" France, "ignore" Germany and "forgive" Russia for their collective position on the Iraq war, simply underscores the inevitable hubris resulting from being the world's only hyperpower.
What is striking, of course, is that this portrait of allied relations does not apply in the field of international trade, economics and - increasingly - finance.
The creation of the EU's single market, the role of the European Commission in representing the collective European interest in WTO trade talks and the emergence (albeit slowly) of the euro as a major international reserve currency mean that the US must and does act in a more multilateral fashion in these areas.
On steel tariffs, for example, the US will inevitably shift its position, not because the WTO has demanded it, or because Tony Blair has asked for it, but because if it doesn't, it will face billions of dollars' worth of trade sanctions imposed by the European Union against a range of politically sensitive US goods - with a special focus on those produced in Florida and Texas.
This does not make an argument for confrontation with the United States, but it simply underscores the stabilising balance of EU-US relations in the field of trade and economics.
It is not likely that such a model will soon be applied to the political/security realm, since to do so would essentially redefine the nature of the European Union. However, the Union has developed its own Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and is embarked upon the creation - for those states that choose to participate - of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
For a few analysts in the United States and Europe these developments are seen as threatening the Atlantic Alliance; others fear the prospect of an EU-US empire; while for some it simply reflects Europe's responsibility to provide for its own security and to contribute to broader efforts for international peace and security.
It might be reasonable to assume, however, that the creation of a credible and effective European foreign, security and defence capacity will have a major impact upon the nature of the US-European relationship.
The nature of that impact might be contested, but it would undoubtedly require a new balance between Europe and the United States. Irish policymakers and voters might like to reflect on where that leaves a small, militarily non-aligned island claiming its own special relationship with the United States.
Prof Ben Tonra holds the Jean Monnet Chair of European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy at the Dublin European Institute in University College Dublin