PoliticsAnalysis

Emotional response to outcomes of possible referendums on unity ranges from pride to hate

Expectations of positive feelings are more prevalent than negative ones, surveys show

Under the Belfast Agreement, a border poll can be held in Northern Ireland on Irish unity and may lead to one in the State too. Photograph Nick Bradshaw
Under the Belfast Agreement, a border poll can be held in Northern Ireland on Irish unity and may lead to one in the State too. Photograph Nick Bradshaw

In the future, referendums might be held, North and South, asking voters to choose between Northern Ireland remaining in the UK or unifying with the rest of Ireland.

How do the public think they would react emotionally to the two possible outcomes?

In the latest ARINS/Irish Times surveys, respondents were presented with three positive emotions: pride, delight and relief. Then, derived from psychological research on violent ethnic conflict, five negative emotions were presented: resentment, hatred, fear, anger and outrage.

Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they would feel each emotion if majorities North and South voted for unity. They were also asked how they would emotionally react to a vote for Northern Ireland remaining in the UK after the referendums.

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Expectations of positive emotions are more prevalent than of negative emotions.

Between 40 and 48 per cent of Catholics on both sides of the Border would be either very or extremely delighted with, or proud of, an Irish unity outcome.

Similarly, 51 per cent of Northern Protestants would be delighted with a pro-Union outcome and 43 per cent would be proud of such a result.

Almost half of Northern Protestants would also feel very or extremely relieved with a pro-Union outcome.

By contrast, just a quarter of Catholics across the island would be relieved with an Irish unity outcome, presumably because relief is more likely to be felt when the status quo is maintained.

If Irish unification prevailed, the most prevalent expected emotional responses to the possible referendum outcomes are therefore the positive emotions of pride and delight among Southerners and Northern Catholics.

These reactions (along with relief) would be matched among Northern Protestants in the event of a win for the Union.

Insofar as respondents expect feeling negative emotions, Northern Protestants indicate they expect to feel these about Irish unification: the proportion expecting to feel very or extremely strongly the five negative emotions varies between just over a fifth and more than a quarter (21 per cent and 27 per cent).

Our surveys suggest that few Southerners or Northern Catholics think that they would have strong negative or positive emotional reactions to a pro-Union outcome. Only one in 10, or fewer, would expect to feel any emotion very or extremely strongly.

Similarly, few Southerners and Northern Catholics anticipate feeling a strong negative emotional reaction to Irish unification – though 11 per cent Catholics in the Republic anticipate feeling fearful in that eventuality.

A model of detailed accommodations for the British identity tradition, with credible plans to ensure economic opportunities and prosperity may help

Social science suggests that some emotional reactions are more easily assuaged than others.

Fear is typically triggered by a perceived threat and may be mitigated by the provision of more information that may reduce the perceived threat level. If advocates of unity reasonably and plausibly advance a model of Irish unification that is genuinely and credibly accommodating of British unionist concerns, then their intense fears may, to some extent, be alleviated.

Resentment is often felt by those who used to be powerful but are no longer, and perhaps especially when they are hostile to the newly dominant group. The resentment some Northern Protestants feel at their loss of their demographic and electoral dominance may have fallen when the referendums are called. Time does not heal all wounds, but it may lower resentment.

Resentment could be reduced further by a model of unification based on non-dominance and the avoidance of any historic retribution. A model of detailed accommodations for the British identity tradition, with credible plans to ensure economic opportunities and prosperity may help.

Anger is more difficult to address. It is associated with: a sense of certainty; an antipathy to reason-based deliberation and an openness to risky behaviour directed at the source of the anger.

Outrage is similarly hard to reduce as it is typically associated with perceptions of moral violation, sometimes regardless of the scale of the negative consequences.

Remembrance Sunday is observed across the UK every November when the dead of two world wars and other conflicts are commemorated. Photograph: Aaron Chown/PA
Remembrance Sunday is observed across the UK every November when the dead of two world wars and other conflicts are commemorated. Photograph: Aaron Chown/PA

But anger and outrage might be partly reduced by ensuring the procedural fairness of the referendums North and South and providing credible and convincing assurances that loss by unionists will not be devastating.

A commitment to enabling British citizenship to be kept may be especially important in helping anger and outrage to subside.

What needs most attention, however, is “hate”. Of the five expected negative emotions among Northern Protestants, “hate” has the strongest association with the likelihood of finding unity “almost impossible to accept”.

Hatred is the emotion most difficult to reduce.

It typically involves regarding the perceived culprit – in this case Irish nationalists – as fundamentally, consistently and irredeemably malevolent. The reduction of hatred is a mission most appropriate to schools, teachers and civil society, but leaders of Irish nationalism should also prioritise visibly displaying generosity in preparing for the possibility of a united Ireland – such as attending Remembrance Day events.

Emotions and rationality are often seen as competing forces, but their interaction is crucial.

Negative emotions have a bad political reputation, but not all of them stop calm and reasonable debate. A little anxiety may be productive, especially if advocates of change properly acknowledge that fearful uncertainty about change is to be expected and they constructively develop and publish plans that foretell the feasible details of change.