Rates exemption `for purposes of science' to be given broad interpretation

In the matter of the Scientific Societies Act 1843.

In the matter of the Scientific Societies Act 1843.

And in the matter of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961.

And in the matter of an appeal against a decision of the Registrar of Friendly Societies under the aforesaid legislation.

The Transport Museum Society of Ireland Limited (appellant) v The Registrar of Friendly Societies (respondent).

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Real Property - Rates - Exemption - Whether society instituted for the purposes of science, literature or the fine arts exclusively - Scientific Societies Act 1843, section 1.

The High Court (before Mr Justice Geoghegan); judgment delivered 5 October 1999.

Where a society claims exemption from rates on the basis that it is instituted for the purposes of science, literature or the fine arts exclusively, the word "science" should be given a broad interpretation; the mere fact that there may be an educational aspect, will not deprive an applicant of the benefit of the exemption.

Mr Justice Geoghegan so held in dismissing the appeal of the respondent.

Anthony P. Quinn BL for the appellant; Patrick Keane SC and James Phillips BL for the respondent.

Mr Justice Geoghegan said that this was an appeal brought by the respondent from a decision of the Circuit Court reversing an earlier decision of the respondent refusing the appellant a certificate under section 1 of the Scientific Societies Act 1843, which provides, inter alia, that no rates shall be assessed in respect of any land or buildings belonging to any society instituted for the purposes of science, literature or the fine arts exclusively.

The appellant was a company limited by guarantee whose principal object was to establish and maintain a working transport museum for scientific and literary purposes and to provide related education for the public benefit. The respondent refused to issue a certificate under the section because he took the view that the appellant was not instituted for the purposes of science, literature or the fine arts exclusively. The Circuit Court, in finding for the appellant, had placed reliance on British Launderers Research Association v Borough of Hendon Rating Authority [1949] 1 KB 462, where it was held that it was not sufficient that a society be instituted mainly or primarily or chiefly for the purposes of science, literature or the fine arts, but that it must be instituted exclusively for those purposes. However other purposes which were merely incidental rather than collateral did not deprive a society of the exemption.

Mr Justice Geoghegan adopted the broader interpretation of the word "science" used in the above case. The judge also stated that he entirely agreed with the conclusions reached by Mrs Justice McGuinness in The Continuing Trustees of Gurteen Agricultural College v The Registrar of Friendly Societies (unreported, 30 July 1999), which also dealt with section 1 of the 1843 Act. Mrs Justice McGuinness had stated, inter alia, that she preferred to approach the matter by looking at the factual evidence of the present purposes and activities of an applicant rather than laying great stress on the documents defining the applicant's purpose.

Mr Justice Geoghegan went on to say that the framework of the memorandum of association did not, merely by reference to the educational aspect, move the appellant from the ambit of section 1. Mr Justice Geoghegan also referred to Cleeve & Others v Limerick City Manager and Commissioner of Valuation [1942] IR 77, where a Divisional Court held that references to other objects did not necessarily preclude it from holding that an association was founded for the purposes of science, literature or the fine arts exclusively.

In dismissing the appeal, Mr Justice Geoghegan went on to state that the word "exclusively" must be given its ordinary meaning and should not be given an artificially literal meaning that would have been almost certainly contrary to the intentions of Parliament. The necessary exclusivity had been established, and a certificate under section 1 should issue.

Solicitors: Kelly & Griffin (Dublin) for the appellant; Patrick J. Morrissey & Co. for the respondent.