Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the European Union may at last be redeeming its promise to admit former communist states to membership.
The enlargement strategy proposed by Romano Prodi's European Commission is well conceived and far-sighted. Its key feature is that all the candidate countries meeting the political criteria are to be allowed to assemble at the starting line, but their progress will depend on their own performance. Enlargement will increase the economic strength of the EU, enhance its security, and, paradoxically, strengthen its political structure by hastening much needed institutional reforms. The Commission's accession strategy deserves enthusiastic support.
Whether it will be able to overcome the objections of individual member states is another matter.
The requirements of membership are onerous and the decision must be unanimous; this gives member states ample scope to protect their special interests.
The European Union is prepared to conclude negotiations with candidate states by 2002. One of the main merits of the Commission's accession strategy is that it forces the EU to confront the structural challenges raised by enlargement - such as the issue of majority voting.
With 13 candidates knocking at the door and additional ones appearing on the horizon, member states cannot tarry. Fortunately, a report on EU reform commissioned by Mr Prodi from three "wise men" - Jean-Luc Dehaene, the former Belgian prime minister; Lord Simon, a former British minister; and Richard von Weizsacker, former German president - has come up with some far-reaching proposals on how to deal with these issues. The "wise men" urged the EU to have reforms in place before 2002, and that is sensible.
The key to Europe's security lies largely beyond its borders. Up to a point its security could be enhanced by enlargement. But many of the states that matter are far from qualifying as candidates for membership. This is particularly true for the western Balkans, but it also applies to countries to the east and south of the EU. With regard to these states, the EU cannot base its policy on accession because they cannot yet be expected to deliver on the reciprocal obligations that accession requires. While holding out the prospect of eventual membership, the EU must take a more one-sided approach, providing assistance to ensure these states eventually qualify. With regard to the Balkans, the international community now recognises it cannot go on reacting to crises; it must take a preventive approach. It was this idea that gave rise to the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.
But the pact is only an empty framework; the EU must put something real on the table. It must offer access to the European single market, assistance in establishing the rule of law and building efficient administrations. This would create the conditions that would attract private capital, foster economic growth and help states qualify for accession. The Balkan crisis is not over. Slobodan Milosevic is still in power in Yugoslavia; Kosovo has not been pacified; tension is rising in Montenegro. The process of disintegration can be reversed only by holding out the prospect of integration with Europe. Only by building democratic, open societies in which borders and governments diminish in importance can the vicious circle of violence be broken. If the European Union follows this approach, Mr Milosevic cannot survive in power and NATO intervention will be crowned by success. This idea will require a plan that goes beyond the competence of the Commissioner for Enlargement. It needs to be spelled out by Mr Prodi and endorsed by the European Council at the Helsinki summit in December.
The author is chairman of Soros Fund Management.
