Comment:It is hard to overstate the capacity for error of the present administration. Serious errors have occurred in so many different areas and with such frequency that the underlying problems must be endemic and system-wide, writes Michael Casey.
Even more worrying, there seems to be no learning mechanism in place. This may reflect the fact that bureaucrats and politicians have one thing in common. They do not readily accept responsibility.
Bureaucrats the world over are more interested in personal reward than in the wider national interest. Indeed the latter concept sits uneasily in any capitalist society. In the Whitaker era in Ireland there may have been individuals who were practical patriots, working for some national ideal beyond themselves, but that was the exception rather than the rule.
Most of the values inculcated by Whitaker melted away shortly after he left public life.
It is hard to detect much public spirit nowadays. The emphasis on self-interest ranges across the spectrum, from the bus driver who leaves passengers waiting in the rain at bus stops, to the policy adviser who takes short cuts with the necessary analysis, from inspectors and regulators who want a quiet life to myopic politicians interested only in local issues.
Of course, there are notable exceptions but, in general, it is clear that the burgeoning administration, despite good pay and conditions, benchmarking and bonus schemes, is finding it difficult to deliver the goods and services required for a modern economy in a timely and cost-efficient way.
Bureaucrats are usually involved in shaping the legislation which will govern them. Over time, of course, systems and procedures become entrenched. It is virtually impossible for younger officials to change these because when they join a bureaucracy they are the most junior - and hence weakest - members of the pyramid. By the time they rise through the ranks, much of their reforming zeal will have worn off.
The system does not reward innovation, so maintaining the status quo is always the safest bet. Passivity becomes a virtue and routine operations tend to be given priority over policy formulation - since the latter could involve change.
Part of our difficulty with responsibility is historical but it is also about lack of practice. In a country which depends on foreign decision-making (in Boston, Berlin and Brussels) for growth, exports and jobs to the extent we do, it is clear that we prefer to "outsource" decisions and responsibilities. Since most of the important decisions are taken abroad, we do not have much opportunity for developing these skills.
Bureaucrats are good at following procedures and keeping an existing system running, or at least ticking over. The problems arise when something challenges the system and forces people to think and operate outside the box. Problem-solving is terra incognita; it is hard, unfamiliar and risky.
The Celtic Tiger and the associated need for investing in infrastructure put demands on the administration that it was ill-equipped to handle. In particular, the escalation of project work was a major shock to the system.
The unique feature of project work - say a tunnel or an aquatic centre or a new prison - is that experience in routine administration is no help at all. With any project, one has to start with a clean sheet; there are few if any precedents to go by and innovative skills are essential. It is uncharted territory which requires interdisciplinary skill sets and entrepreneurship.
Most of these projects are large scale and high profile. Enter the PR people, programme managers and political advisers. Politicians themselves will often try to tweak projects for constituency reasons. Demotivational issues are added to the lack of in-house skills, alongside the desire to avoid responsibility.
The ham-fisted attempt at decentralisation has contributed to demotivation, especially since there was no consultation with the principals involved. There is no attention paid to whether productivity will suffer or not. It is almost as if politicians do not see public officials as being productive at all, but rather as low-value chess pieces that can be moved at will.
Is there light at the end of the tunnel? It is easy to say that the public sector needs to be re-skilled and restructured, but the reality is that skilled people don't come cheap and the unions do not like to see pay differentials being disturbed. Public sector unions have grown strong on successive bouts of social partnership. The unions are also strong because they have the support of senior political figures. This limits the scope for public sector reform.
No doubt many politicians are concerned about public sector work practices and the limited prospect of reform. This is one reason they turn to the privatisation option, even though privatisation contains its own risks and hazards.
It is unlikely that the error count will diminish in future years and it is disappointing that the national development plan wasn't scaled back as the ESRI had recommended. More taxpayers' money will no doubt continue to be wasted as the errors mount up.
In the long run it may be that immigration and multiculturalism will refresh the gene pool, dilute the colonial baggage, and make us less wary about decision-making and responsibility. But that will take decades.
Michael Casey is a former chief economist with the Central Bank of Ireland
