Chinese walls and accountability have been hot topics in the business world recently - the former because of the relationship between financial analysts and the firms for which they work, and the latter because of the sudden collapse of Independent Insurance in Britain.

I've written before about the strange world of the equity analyst whose creative writing can far outclass that of a mere novelist.

Particularly important is the ability to inject new meaning into the word "hold", especially in combination with the adjectives "strong" and "weak". Depending on the tenor of the piece, hold means you should sell, you should probably sell or you should get the hell out fast. But, of course, the difficulty for the analyst is that if you tell someone that the stock is a weak hold while your firm is the broker to that company, the powers-that-be are going to consider that your position within the hallowed portals is a bit of a weak hold too.

Both analysts and firms generally protest (Lady Macbeth style) about their complete and utter independence of thought and action - which is when those blessed Chinese walls are mentioned.

But it is still an uncomfortable situation to know that one division of the firm can be actively trying to win business from a client company while the other wants to trash its management and is suggesting that the shares could be given away free in cornflakes boxes.

Despite the financial services sector's continued assurances that Chinese walls exist and that analysts can say what they like, the truth is that impartiality is very difficult. ( Half the time the Chinese walls probably exist purely as a matter of incompetence because nobody on the 10th floor is talking to anyone on the 15th.)

In the aftermath of the technology annihilation, when investors wanted to know why so-called gurus such as Mary Meeker continued to recommend shares that were sinking faster than a concrete block in a swimming pool, many analysts admitted to being pressurised into writing glowing reports about companies that their own firm was trying to take to the market or raise new capital for.

And, of course, their personal and substantial bonuses depended on the company earning massive fees for initial public offerings or other placings.

The Chinese walls were, indeed, made of paper in some cases. So now the majority of people read analysts reports in much the same way as they read estate agents' descriptions of charming properties in need of minor repair.

Once you know the coded messages, everything else falls into place. The Independent Insurance case is somewhat different and raises a question that gets aired every so often but then disappears again. How truly independent is the auditor of a company when that company is paying the auditor's fees?

Especially if that company may also be a consultant to its client in other areas? Who then, should be brought to book when the client company goes from being the darling of the sector to busted flush in a couple of weeks?

Independent Insurance wasn't a company that I took much notice of but surely the auditors should have? KPMG says that it made extensive checks.

How extensive was extensive? In the past, auditors have come to me with queries about accounts and I've given them explanations that (on mature reflection) were designed to get them out of my hair as quickly as possible.

Presumably, if anything had been seriously wrong instead of me being seriously busy and not interested in talking to them, they'd have found it. Or would they? Most times the only auditors I've ever met have been trainees who try to look important but actually haven't a clue. Why should they? They're not dealers. They're not insurers. They're not experts in your business. If you give them a jargon-laden answer, how many are going to admit their ignorance? In my experience, none!

The problems for industry as a whole are exacerbated by the fact that it's now the norm for financial services companies to be one-stop shops in the provision of analysis, raising of capital, taxation and other advice to their clients.

Most of this was brought about by that whole "synergy" thing of the 1990s and the dash for growth in the services sector that led to big firms gobbling up their competitors and then merging with each other to form new firms with mind-bogglingly long names. Like the equity analysts, it's difficult to query the accounts of the firm that's contributing hugely to your company's overall profitability - and, indirectly, to your bonus.

I don't think it's a very healthy thing but it's happening all the time as companies continue to merge or are taken over. It's become common to receive your annual insurance quotation and discover that your insurer is now a member of some other international group that you've never even heard of and whose headquarters are in Paris, Brussels or Rome. (Obviously, if you voted Yes in the Nice referendum you won't mind these locations. If you voted No you'll be tearing your hair out and muttering about our loss of sovereignty).

But you, as a policyholder, might not even have heard of these changes until the renewal notice plops onto the mat. My own insurance company has gone through about three different takeovers since I first took out a policy and each time I get the latest promotional leaflets about how much they care about me as a policyholder and how I can rest assured that their Irish/British/European global network is looking after my best interests.

However, in the case of Independent Insurance, it seems that the institutional investors are peeved that their best interests certainly haven't been looked after (performance levels for those of them who held shares in Independent will be jolted, thus impacting on business and bonus levels this year). So they're now considering legal action.

And the Financial Services Authority, which regulates the City - although it has actually cut some of that regulation because it will be taking on new powers later in the year (but don't worry, it's only non-urgent regulation that they've culled!) - has called in the fraud squad.

In the end, the analysts who write glowing recommendations followed by "weak hold" calls for stocks may find their reputations tarnished but they're usually still in a job. I've yet to hear of the managing director of an audit company resigning because one of its clients went bust after its accounts were okayed. Lack of accountability in business is still a problem.

But I'm not sure that it's a problem anyone really wants to address.