The sale is part of the Kremlin's drive to regain control of Russia's energy resources , writes Conor Sweeneyin Moscow

Four years after Russian oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky was dramatically arrested at gunpoint, the final steps to dismantle his oil company, Yukos, are almost complete, while he languishes in jail.

His nemesis, Russian president Vladimir Putin, has now completed his long-term objective of placing most of Russia's abundant energy resources back under Kremlin control and out of the hands of uncooperative Russian firms and meddling multinationals.

In a fitting end to the intrigue that has always surrounded the sudden crackdown and forced bankruptcy of Yukos, its headquarters and other assets were bought by a mysterious firm called Prana for about four times the expected price.

Now pumping out more oil than countries like Nigeria or Iraq, state-controlled Rosneft has emerged as the main beneficiary of Yukos's demise. The biggest loser is Khodorkovsky, who resides in a Russian prison camp after his conviction for tax evasion. Fresh charges for money laundering could mean that the man who was once Russia's richest individual will be behind bars until 2015.

Western institutional shareholders have lost out too, as they watched the value of their investments in Yukos all but evaporate. Nevertheless, there has been no shortage of foreign investors willing to take a punt on Russia's ongoing economic boom.

Though few Russians have sympathy with the fate of the oligarchs who became billionaires through the chaotic switch to market capitalism in the 1990s, most of Khordokovsky's contemporaries are either in exile or weathering out the Putin era. Khodorkovsky was more confrontational, directly challenging the Kremlin occupants rather than quietly consolidating his business interests.

Through his lawyers, Khodorkovsky condemned the sale of Yukos's last assets, necessary to pay off the €25 billion back-tax claim brought against the firm.

"This is the ending we have been expecting for some time," said Robert Amsterdam, the international defence counsel to Khodorkovsky. "From the beginning of the attack on Yukos and the unlawful imprisonment of my client, to the final rigged auction, the process has been riddled with procedural and legal violations which have thoroughly discredited any claim of legitimacy to the charges by the state."

These allegations have been vigorously rejected by the government, which insists that Yukos had been systematically defrauding the Russian taxpayer.

The broader point for foreign investors, as analysts in Moscow have noted, was that Khordokovsky's arrest marked the end of the disorder associated with the collapse of communism. It also signalled to western investors that the Kremlin was firmly in charge of Russia's economy.

Although there was little enthusiasm from investors to compete with Rosneft for other units of the Yukos business when they came under the hammer, the firm's 22-storey building attracted an intensive bidding war, which lasted nearly three hours. It has even been suggested that an unaccounted-for treasure trove may be hidden in some of the other assets sold off last week, which might explain the intense interest.

It is not clear yet who controls Prana, the firm which bought the assets, though there is speculation it may be linked to Rosneft's main competitor in the Russian energy market, Gazprom, the other state-controlled giant.

Ironically, the €1.2 billion price tag means that the state's entire tax bill has been paid off, with a few minor assets still due for disposal.

For the brave, it could mark a good time to buy some Yukos shares, though Alfa Bank research in Moscow was not optimistic about the likelihood of a dividend being paid out: "Despite this theoretical upside of 74 per cent to the current market price, we do not recommend investors put money into such a risky stock. Yukos shareholders may still receive new negative surprises as the disgraced oil company may very well be put under additional political and/or financial pressure."

The auction coincided with a fresh round of political manoeuvres by the Kremlin to shore up its strong links to neighbouring gas exporters Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

A flurry of deals will ensure that both countries stay close to the Kremlin and not drift under the influence of the EU or, worse from the Russian perspective, the US.

Agreement with Turkmenistan on the route of a new gas pipeline across Russia ensures that the great game to control energy assets remains firmly in Moscow's sphere of influence. Not only does Moscow control most of the country's oil and gas firms, but also the distribution networks which take the supplies of its neighbours all the way from central Asia to the western European market, which is becoming increasingly dependant on Russian fossil fuels.

It is expected that Putin might even become the chairman of Gazprom or Rosneft when he leaves office. If the latter, he would be in control of the firm that swallowed up most of Yukos's former oil fields and refineries.