The demise of Mackie International as a publicly quoted group will provide plenty of fodder to those who are wary about investing in quoted Northern Ireland companies. As evidence, they could cite Powerscreen International, the Dungannon-based engineering company, which almost collapsed in a welter of debt. On a lesser scale, they could point to Galen Holdings, the pharmaceuticals group, which had an unnecessary four-month share suspension while it was having reverse takeover discussions with the Dutch group, Ferring. Those discussions were subsequently abandoned at a cost of £2.73 million sterling (€3.9 million). And Boxmore International, the packaging group, recorded a drop in pre-tax profits, from £8.6 million (€12.5 million) to £7.3 million (€10.6 million), in the six months ended June 30th, 1998. That represented its first reversal since it gained a share quotation on the Irish market in 1989.

However, these incidences do not point to a specific malaise. Mackie's demise, for example, was looming; bluntly, it has been unable to make money. In contrast, Powerscreen was hit because it was selling machines at a loss and covering up that dismal position with accounting irregularities. Following a revamp of the board and the group's financial structure, it is now back on a growth path. The glitch at Galen was temporary; it continues in a strong growth mode. Boxmore, however, is likely to record a drop in full-year profits, and appears to have gone into an ex-growth mode.

But the only terminal company is Mackie, now in the hands of joint administrative receivers Mr Roger Powdrill and Mr Tom Keenan of Deloitte & Touche. Although they have refused to take questions - surprisingly for receivers of a publicly quoted group - it is obvious that they had to deal with a cash crisis. This was clear from the 57 redundancies announced just two days after they moved into the group.

Indeed, it was the realisation by the directors that the group would not have been able to meet its debts as they fell due this month that forced them to put the group into receivership. Otherwise, the directors could have been held liable for the group's debts. That Mackie has gone into receivership is not a surprise; what is surprising is that it has survived so long. It has been kept in existence only by substantial grants, and drip-feeding from weary shareholders, possibly to the tune of some £40 million sterling (€58 million) in total. The last drip-feed was in the form of a rights issue which raised £5 million (€7.2 million). Around two-thirds of this amount was left with the underwriters, and that followed a failed rights issue a year earlier. That £5 million, however, was essential for continued bank support.

The rights issues always looked like a sticking-plaster job despite the momentum created by the new chief executive, Mr Sul Sahota. His actions included the replacement of the firm's lawyers, stockbrokers and financial advisers, plus a massive restructuring programme. Some of the benefits of this programme were starting to come through - a pre-tax loss of £1.9 million (€2.8 million) in the first half of 1998 was well below the loss of £5.4 million (€7.8 million) in the same period in 1997. But while Mackie was still optimistic that it could go into profit before the end of 1998, group borrowings were inching up all the time - £17 million (€24.6 million) at the end of June and rising.

In order to utilise the capacity of its new foundry, Mackie purchased Rice in 1997 to make use of its order book. And the proposed purchase of Shield Engineering, of Leicester, was similarly motivated; in effect, it was buying a customer. While this policy might have worked in the short term, that sort of vertical integration was hardly sustainable in the long-term. So when Mackie was unable to raise the required £15 million, it might have been a blessing in disguise for the participants. Who is to say that, down the road, further injections might not have been required? The receivers are hoping to sell the business as a group, and as a going concern, consisting of three companies: Mackie International, Springvale Foundry and Automatic Temperature Controls. However, they may have to put up with a piecemeal sale. Mackie, whose factory straddled the "peace line" in West Belfast, was seen as a symbol of economic regeneration in Northern Ireland. It came onto the stock market (London first, then Dublin) shortly after the 1994 ceasefire. Ironically, had the Belfast Agreement been in place, there would have been great pressure on the new Assembly to bail out Mackie.

But now, five years later, one thing is certain - Mackie International is unlikely to be resurrected as a publicly quoted company. Perhaps it should never have bothered seeking a share quotation. That way, it would not have been instrumental in putting further question-marks against investing in Northern Ireland's publicly quoted groups.