Chief executive has achieved what has eluded some of the best minds in Irish business over the past decade, writes Emmet Oliver

As Aer Lingus shares crept up to €2.45 yesterday, valuing the company at over €1.2 billion, the Aer Lingus chief executive Dermot Mannion was packing his bags ahead of a well earned break in the United States. The shares started out at €2.20 on Wednesday.

While argument will continue to rage over the final float price, Mannion can reflect that he has at last actually achieved what eluded some of the best and brightest minds in Irish business over the past decade.

For all of their savvy, broad experience and ambitious natures, none of the company's previous chief executives were able to drag Aer Lingus out of the semi-State sector, either by way of flotation, a strategic alliance or a trade sale.

Willie Walsh, Gary Cullen, Gary McGann, Michael Foley, Larry Stanley and David Kennedy all failed to get Aer Lingus to this point. In each case, there were mitigating circumstances, unscheduled events, political interference and even the odd court case.

In the case of Walsh, it is fair to acknowledge that he softened up the Cabinet on an initial public offering (IPO) by proposing his own "alternative investment" proposal, believed by most to be some type of MBO.

This allowed Mannion to take the baton for the final leg of the race. In the case of some Aer Lingus bosses, there was support for the idea of privatisation, but not the long-term commitment to make it happen.

In February 2000, Gary Cullen resigned suddenly, saying that he wanted to go for "personal reasons", with a gruelling privatisation coming down the line.

He commented that he has "given full consideration to the position of chief executive during the initial public offering process and its aftermath and decided that, for personal reasons, this is a role I'd not wish for myself".

For his part Kennedy, back in 1997, admitted that not being able to persuade the Government to privatise the airline was probably his biggest regret. "I don't think there is any future for major international commercial enterprises which are State-owned," he commented.

But history is not necessarily a fair judge. Mannion, whatever happens from this point on, will at least be able to claim credit as the Aer Lingus boss who got the company listed on the stock markets.

Chief executives come and go, of course, and many of those mentioned above have carved out bigger and better careers since departing Aer Lingus.

Ministers too have tried to fatten up Aer Lingus for sale, only to find their ambitions thwarted by a combination of international downturns, trade union intransigence and, of course, the catastrophic events of 9/11.

Alan Dukes, Mary O'Rourke, Michael Lowry, Séamus Brennan were just some of the politicians who failed to get to the point of sale. Martin Cullen managed it, but he was building on some preparatory work by Séamus Brennan.

One of the reasons so many Ministers and chief executives failed to get to this point is that immense intellectual capital was spent on a rag bag of questionable ideas over the years designed to nudge Aer Lingus into a more profitable and sustainable path.

There was the ownership of the Copthorne hotel chain, the investment in the personnel company PARC Group, the trans-atlantic routes out of Belfast and the decision to develop a computer services company Cara.

Some of these made money for the airline, but they often distracted management from the mundane task of flying aircraft to international destinations at a profit.

People forget that Aer Lingus owned a helicopter company until 1995. All businesses of course have non-core subsidiaries. But in the case of Aer Lingus, things became surreal in 1995 when one of its subsidiaries, Devtec, signed a contract to produce parts for a rocket launcher.

There was also the plan to get CityJet to operate some of the airline's routes, the strategic alliance with British Airways and American Airlines and the attempt to "re-vamp" the shamrock.

Amid this blizzard of ideas were some decent ones. Back in 1996, some unidentified soul suggested the establishment of a division called Aer Lingus Express. It suggested the heretical notion of developing a low-cost service for short-hop routes to compete with Ryanair. The initiative was abandoned.

Back in 1996, an airline spokesman even found it necessary to point out that Aer Lingus was not in any way considering a move towards low-cost, no-frills operation.

The airline continued to claim that, while not prepared to fully plunge into low-cost operations, its fares were coming down and it was starting to meet the Ryanair challenge. However, this assertion lacked credibility during the tenure of a succession of chief executives. For example, a seat sale in October 2001, meant to stimulate demand after 9/11, still had huge flaws in it. A week later, a man was quoted a return fare to Paris of £614.

While Mannion will be able to walk tall if there is ever a re-union of former Aer Lingus chief executives, his management team are also an interesting group. Many of them, like Greg O'Sullivan, Dick Butler and Enda Corneille, were blooded in the years when the airline went from strategic blunder to strategic blunder.

While they were not responsible for these mis-steps, they must have learned valuable lessons in periods when wisdom was in short supply.

While some of the wilder strategic decisions mentioned above may now appear curious, they were taken in different times and often taken because the airline's core business was under such pressure. Unless taken private in future years, the airline's future mistakes and triumphs will now be on a very public stage.