There you have it in a nutshell. While the US Federal Reserve's statutes balance the objectives of price stability with those of employment and growth, those of the European Central Bank (ECB) scarcely dilute its obligation to sound money at all.
It owes its paternity to the Bundesbank and the German pathological fear of inflation, and its bloodline to the 12th century Czech chronicler Cosmas who warned that the debasement of currency is "worse than plagues, more disastrous than an enemy invasion, than famine or other calamities" . Nothing less would pass muster with those who have been asked to give up their beloved mark.
Eight months from now 11 countries representing 300 million people will create a monetary union that will account for 18 per cent of global production and 19 per cent of world trade. Its currency will be run from the Frankfurt glass tower that currently houses the European Monetary Institute (EMI) by the latter's successor, the ECB. Guaranteed independent from the influence of politicians to a degree that makes even the Bundesbank jealous, the ECB, and the network of national central banks that will operate under its authority, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), will be the most powerful financial institution ever created.
And, make no mistake, its remit will touch every one of us through its control of interest rates, a sword of Damocles hanging over every government that is tempted into profligacy.
Ireland will be part of it, with one vote on the bank's council, a reality that has made many nervous that the needs of a high-growth economy, with prices straining at the leash, may be sidelined by those of a sluggish European recovery.
Commission sources acknowledge the difficulty, but argue bluntly that some sovereignty one vote is better than none. Today interest rate movements are in reality dictated, they argue, by the Bundesbank and the markets. Ireland will have to find other means of controlling its inflationary pressures.
That's not to say that the relationship between the bank and any of Europe's governments will be easy. The French President, Jacques Chirac, has fallen out publicly several times with his nominee for the presidency of the bank, Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, the head of the Banque de France. A tension between elected governments and their central bankers is inevitable and that reality is likely to be no different at EU level.
The bank's independence is copperfastened by the Maastricht Treaty which forbids member-states or the Commission from seeking to influence members of the council of the bank and guarantees the members of the executive board eight-year terms. Peter Kenan of Princeton University argues that "because the members of the executive board cannot be reappointed they should not feel the need to please politicians".
That point is important in the current row over the appointment of bank's president rumours suggest that attempts are being made to reconcile the ambitions of Mr Trichet and the Dutch favourite for the job, Mr Wim Duisenberg, by appointing the latter for only four years of the term. Bundesbank Council members, however, have made it clear they would regard such a move as undermining the perception of the bank's independence.
Despite the fierce determination of the French to snatch the job, few really believe there is any fundamental difference of approach between the two men. The contest is less about ideology and more to do with national prestige. The result is likely to determine the management style of the bank rather than the content of its policy.
Both are highly qualified academically. Trichet is one of France's elite enarques and his rival is a former professor of economics. Both have served as central bank governors either as minister, in Duisenberg's case, or senior adviser to finance minister and president, in Trichet's. The two men have come through the social democratic movement but have more than proved their credentials as the most orthodox disciplinarians of central bankers. Both have demonstrated considerable domestic success in bringing currencies under control and inflation under wraps.
Trichet is a typical French intellectual, whose real passion is literature, while the more congenial Duisenberg heads for the golf course at the drop of a hat.
Currently head of the EMI, Duisenberg is seen as very much a clone of the German central banker Hans Tietmeyer whom he admires, and has strong support from the Bundesbank. Indeed until the surprise nomination of Trichet, only the French appeared to have any objections to him.
The row has begun now to seriously threaten the credibility of the ECB and although the legal requirement is for an appointment before the beginning of July, there are now fears of an adverse market reaction if agreement is not reached this weekend.
A less fierce argument also has to be resolved about the composition of the six-person executive board of the bank. The ECB will be run by a council consisting of the central bank governors of each of the participating states and of the executive board of fulltime bankers. The board's nominees each serve non-renewable eight-year terms and there is an attempt to balance between large and small state membership.
Sources suggest that the likely initial composition of the board will include a German, Otmar Issing, a Dutchman, Duisenberg, an Italian, Tommaso Paddoa-Schioppa, a Finnish woman, Sirkka Hamalainen, a Frenchman, Trichet or another, and either a Spaniard or a Belgian.
Their challenge from July will be to put flesh on the preparatory work done by the EMI for the management of the single currency. Key decisions still remain to be taken such as the precise role of the national central banks within the network of the ESCB.
The physical issuing of currency will remain a domestic responsibility although its quantity will be determined centrally. And there is considerable support for the idea that open market operations, the buying and selling of currency to manage the single currency at ECB direction, will actually be conducted at national level, although some favour giving the ECB a limited role in the markets.
The main tool of management is likely to be monetary aggregate targets in line with Bundesbank policy, although some economists prefer using inflation targets. Recent problems with the M3 monetary aggregate in Germany, however, suggest some combination of the two approaches the increasing use of the mark in eastern Europe has made its quantity an unreliable indicator of domestic inflation pressures, economists say. Similar problems could occur with the euro.
Initially, the ECB will only have an advisory role in the supervision of banks and financial institutions although the treaty allows real powers to be passed to it. Some central bankers are understood to believe that its role should be extended to the monitoring of multinational financial institutions. And the bank's role as lender of last resort in the event of a major international default is still unclear.
The bank may wish to set minimum deposit rates for commercial banks in line with the German system.
Preparation of a payment system, Target, is substantially complete, although rows about the price of access by non-euro countries to intra-day lending facilities still have to be resolved.
The issue has seen a bitter, though Commission sources insist exaggerated, dispute between Britain and others with the Germans arguing that Britain cannot expect a free ride if it is not on board the euro train.
The council will also have to decide quickly how much of national foreign reserves it will require to be lodged with it, and to allocate shares to the participating member-states (this is done on the basis of a formula that balances population with GDP). National central banks are likely to find themselves with significant foreign reserves left over.
While exchange rate policy remains the preserve of Finance Ministers at Ecofin (only the participants in the euro voting), the ECB has the right to be consulted on proposed policy statements and it is unlikely to be ignored.
But the real challenge of the new bank will be to persuade the European public that it has their interests at heart. Tough medicine is not popular, and the principle of autonomy makes the sort of accountability MEPs would like impossible. Clearly the bank will have to evolve means of operating in as transparent a fashion as possible, not something that comes easily to central bankers. Duisenberg has said that he wants a "regular dialogue" with the Parliament's Monetary Committee.
He has also made plain that the new organisation of 500 bankers will be "slim and lean"
there will be no repeating the fiasco in London when the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development spent £40 million on the marble of its foyer. These are different times.
