Less than a year after the Maastricht meeting, the Republic's faith was to be severely tested. At this remove, few remember just how much upheaval the economy went through during the currency crisis. Interbank interest rates shot up to hundreds of percentage points - imposing an extraordinary cost on business - mortgage borrowers faced rates in the mid-teens and exporters were squeezed as the pound - or "The Mighty Punt" as one headline writer dubbed it - rose over the £1.10 sterling barrier.

Bertie Ahern was the man in the hot-seat at the time, supported first by the Progressive Democrats led by Dessie O'Malley and later - in the devaluation move, by Labour. Indeed, had the government not fallen and an election been called for November 1992, then it is likely that the decision to devalue would have been taken before Christmas 1992, rather than being left to late January.

Bertie Ahern's key advisers at the time were Department of Finance secretary Sean Cromien and second secretary Maurice O'Connell, while Maurice Doyle in the Central Bank and Michael Somers in the NTMA completed the war cabinet.

Given the pressure on business and the apparent hopelessness of the fight, a majority on this group would surely have opted to devalue earlier, had the Fianna Fail interregnum government not felt hamstrung by its status. In one extraordinary day, in early January 1993, Mr Ahern, giving a press briefing on the exchequer returns, let his guard down for the first time and hinted ever so gently that the government's commitment might not be absolute. Publication was enough to lead to another run on the pound. The pressure then eased - leading some to proclaim that the fight was won - before a new bout of selling at the end of January left the government bowing to the inevitable.