This time 40 years ago the Congo dominated the headlines. But why and how in 1960 were the Irish given the hot seat of the UN Command in Katanga, where 26 of our soldiers were to lose their lives?

Kivu Province was larger than West Germany, so the UN asked for a second battalion to join our 32nd Infantry Battalion, already there. A skeleton brigade HQ would live with one battalion, using its communications to control the other. Speed was emphasised.

Events changed everything. A gallantly persistent band of journalists managed to follow the battalions and get news and pictures home. A witty story emanated from an embassy in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) that an advance party's rifles were stolen. The fact that the party travelled by civil aircraft without weapons was not allowed to spoil the story.

The late Col Harry Byrne was appointed Brigade Commander. On August 10th I travelled with him to an operations appointment in Force HQ.

President Tshombe, the rightfully-elected head of Katanga province, had declared an independent Katanga state. No one recognised this. He refused to admit UN troops.

Dag Hammarskjold, the UN Secretary-General, flew to Elisabethville (capital of Katanga, now Lubumbashi) on August 12th. Tshombe recognised the inevitable and agreed to admit UN troops.

The operations staff in Leopoldville got preliminary orders from Elisabethville about the command and deployment of UN troops in the province. Contingents were named for the command and the orders then countermanded. Political pressures were probably the cause.

Tshombe's backers wanted European troops in Elisabethville. He could not have got a guarantee. Indian Signals and then combat troops came later.

At about 6 pm or 7 pm on August 14th, Col McCarthy got a cable saying that Col Byrne was to be UN Commander in the provinces of Kivu and Katanga - to be called Eastern Command (later Sub-Command Eastern Provinces - SCOMEP). His HQ was to be in Elisabethville. This was stunning news.

Instead of two Irish battalions, he would now have seven, possibly eight, from Sweden, Ethiopia, two from Morocco, and one each from Mali and (coming by sea) Indonesia. Instead of an area as big as West Germany, he was going to get one as big as Spain plus West Germany.

In addition to Kivu, which Lieut-Col Mortimer Buckley and his troops had kept calm, he was getting a mineral-rich province on the brink of civil war and attempted secession. His skeleton staff of three officers would be inadequate. Col McCarthy said officers should be taken from the units.

Col Byrne decided to take Comdt Kevin O'Brien, 33rd Battalion 2i/c, who was passing through with its advance party. Col McCarthy said he would inform Dublin. Col Byrne then said he had no signal officer. Col McCarthy immediately volunteered me.

It was all quick and businesslike. I got frequencies from the force signal officer. We caught a plane for Elisabethville at around midnight.

We were warned that our landing might be opposed. At Elisabethville airport we could see uniformed men drawn up on the tarmac. Tshombe could be a realist. If you can't beat them, parade for them. The police, gendarmerie, fire brigade, civil defence, Red Cross and other organisations were turned out.

We met Gen von Horn and Ian Berendsen, special representative of the UN Secretary General. Col Byrne had reviewed his mission and requirements during the flight down. He said he was well briefed about Kivu, but knew little about Katanga.

The general said that this was not a complete disadvantage. Minds were made up about Katanga. Col Byrne could look at it with a fresh mind. Mr Berendsen would advise on politics. Col Byrne asked me to outline the communications shortages - we had no equipment to control our battalions.

Von Horn said his HQ would help but that I should buy whatever I could.

Col Byrne asked about staff. The general said he could help - he had too many high-ranking ones in Leopoldville. "But I would advise you to get them from your own units. Keep your staff small." Leopoldville had shown that this was good advice.

Mr Berendsen then briefed us on getting the Belgian troops out of Katanga, as UN resolutions required. A meeting on Belgian deployment was arranged for Mr Tshombe's HQ. The reception there was cold. The Belgian colonel asked the purpose of our visit.

"To ascertain the Belgian deployment in Katanga" was the reply. A detailed briefing in high-speed French on a Katanga map ensued. O'Brien got little of it, but did not hesitate. He said to Berendsen: "Please give the colonel my compliments on the logical deployment of his troops in Katanga."

It was exactly the right thing to say. The Belgians knew they had to go, but the politesse cracked the ice. We got a map trace. From then on it was a military matter of time, space and distances.

Col. E.D. Doyle is a retired former head of the Army's Signal Corps