THIS is a necessary book. Prof James says that the literature on Britain's part in the Congo crisis is almost non existent. His interest in peace keeping operations was, for a long time, rather unfashionable. There are many emulators now, but few with his abilities. His clarity and thorough research continue.
James traces the indirect effects of the Congo on Britain's decline. Ultimately, she lost the diplomatic struggle and "in overall terms she, out of all the external actors, came out worst". Random quotations cannot convey his careful arguments. He should be read as a whole.
Many considered Britain's attitude on seceding, mineral rich Katanga to be self serving. Prof James shows that her stress on law and order in Katanga was "genuinely felt". There was more at stake than mineral interests the future of the nearby Central African Federation arose. Because Katanga was an "island of order" in a chaotic country, the situation should not be upset.
The mining areas of the south were quiet. However, as Keith Kyle said in his lecture at Magee College last year (reprinted in the excellent "Occasional Paper 2" issued by INCORE) the writ of the Katangese authorities "did not run throughout the whole province". North Katanga was in revolt against President Tshombe's attempts to defend and enforce secession (although there were tribal and economic factors). Trains were wrecked, gendarmerie ambushed. The cry of Congo Unie" and the upraised single finger met us in most villages.
Afro Asians saw Katanga as an ominous precedent for their future. The Commonwealth was involved. Britain's policy of playing for time, blocking any armed action but seeming to do little for reunification, was open to misinterpretation. She did not present her policy well.
All concerned knew that time is the friend of "facts on the ground" it makes them harder to question or reverse. Consider Northern Ireland, the West Bank and Golan Heights, Northern Cyprus.
Every month that passed saw Kag consolidating as an independent state. Tshombe, the lawfully elected President of the Province of Katanga, was styled President of the "Etat du Kalanga". In the capital, Elisabethville, we saw the rapid creation of a flag, a national anthem, a separate currency and a Foreign Ministry the mercenaries were arriving, the gendarmerie were recruiting.
Operation Rumpunch the UN's arrest and expulsion of non Congolese officers and mercenaries in August, 1961 started successfully, but was not completed.
Prof James finds that Conor Cruise O'Brien was carrying out instructions when the second, more drastic, Operation Morthor, was launched. This has been in doubt due to the silence of those who instructed him. It pre dated Dr O'Brien's present attitude on force. Kyle says Dr O'Brien "was inclined to favour strong action and was therefore unlikely to raise objections". James sees Morthor as "the conduct by the UN of a Provincial coup on behalf of the Central Government", and an intervention in an internal conflict, contrary to the original Security Council resolution.
James says that the Irish and Swedish battalion commanders queried their orders with Dr O'Brien not easy for regular officers to do. They "were given his assurance that the operation was in accord with UN policy".
Fighting and bloodshed resulted. British pressure on the Secretary General intensified Hammarskj old asked. "What have our critics done in order to bring Mr Tshombe to his senses?"
It took another year and two more rounds of fighting to impose the will of the Security Council and end Katanga's secession. America was actively behind the UN by then. "Britain's observations were politely heard, and wholly ignored" by the US and the UN. {CORRECTIONS} 96061900014
