Dangerous territory for sovereign governments

IT WAS as if the bombs hadn't happened

IT WAS as if the bombs hadn't happened. Through that long, dark Friday night a weekend of deep foreboding to the sombre statements to the House of Commons and the Dail.

Through the grief and shock, the message was plain. The "peace process" would go on. Politicians and people took comfort where they could. Hopeful theories were polished and refined. Perhaps it was a one off an attempt to "put manners" on the Brits. Mr Gerry Adams clearly hadn't been told about the bomb. Perhaps he could retrieve the situation. Reinstating the ceasefire was the first priority.

Alongside that, British and Irish ministers vowed to overcome their disagreements. The spinners went to work. The press, for the most part, obliged. Wednesday's papers were almost unanimous in their belief that a London Dublin accord was imminent. "Proximity talks" and elections were back on the agenda. Mr Bruton and Mr Spring signalled the possible marriage of the two. Mr Major, at his most emollient, assured them elections were the door to immediate all party negotiations.

It mattered not that ministers from both capitals continued to conduct the debate in terms of the options blown apart at one minute past seven last Friday night. The consensus was quickly established that Mr Adams had been kept in the dark. Indeed the theory was advanced that this had been deliberately so, to keep his hands clean and cast him as the reasonable centre rather than the violent periphery of the republican movement.

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For understandable reasons, people chose not to dwell on the more crucial question at what point did Mr Adams know the ceasefire was to be ended? For once that decision was made, the location of a bomb in Britain was merely a matter of detail. In the same spirit, public and press indulged ministers who determined not to be deflected. What choice did they have? The alternative was a self fulfilling prophecy, a speedy descent into the abyss.

Even on Thursday, few wanted to challenge the mood of unreality. The IRA statement caused shock and disappointment as if the one delivered in London's Docklands had not been eloquent enough about the IRA's intentions. The full impact of the triple whammy statement in An Phoblacht, the second London device, and Mr Adams's speech on Thursday night was somehow lost. Thankfully the latest device had been defused. And Mr Adams had written to Mr Major renewing his peace overture.

But Mr Major and Mr Bruton are this weekend struggling with the realities attending Mr Adams's forceful, if simple, message. The ceasefire would only be reinstated in exchange for all party negotiations, operating within a clearly defined time limit, commenced without any preconditions whatsoever.

Even if they wished, neither the Taoiseach nor the Prime Minister can deliver what Mr Adams demands. Evens if the IRA decided tomorrow to reinstate the ceasefire, there is no automatic way back to the conditions obtaining before the bomb. As British ministers hedged their bets, that central truth was clear to the key players in Dublin.

Dublin had long railed against Britain's various preconditions for all party talks. But, like it or not, the British and the unionists believe last Friday's events made their case. That reality, too, was recognised in Dublin this week even as hopes soared that the two governments would quickly get the process back on track.

Even before Friday, the Ulster Unionists refused to give hard and fast assurances that an elected body would proceed directly to negotiation within the "three stranded" process. They are even less likely to now.

Mr David Trimble will meet Mr Major at Downing Street next Tuesday. The Prime Minister will almost certainly find the UUP leader in uncompromising mood.

He doesn't want to abandon the elections option But he is certain to tell Mr Major he finds the path to any negotiation involving Sinn Fein even more hazardous than before. Had he any doubts about that upon his return from Washington, a difficult meeting of his parliamentary party on Thursday dispelled them.

So Mr Major and Mr Trimble will resume discussions about the very preconditions Mr Adams has already rejected. And they will cover ground already well worked in talks between British ministers and other Northern Ireland parties.

The UUP is not clear whether "proximity talks" (demanded by Dublin) should precede or follow elections although they can probably accommodate themselves to some variation of the theme. However, they are resolutely opposed (as is the Alliance Party) to Mr John Hume's proposal for a party plebiscite. The UUP believes an "elected body" sitting in plenary sessions the only vehicle for any form of dialogue with Sinn Fein in the foreseeable future.

Mr Trimble has already referred to the possibility of requiring candidates to sign some form of non violence pledge. And among the options currently under consideration is that this might incorporate the Mitchell report. In any event, the unionists are clear that Sinn Fein would have to commit itself to Mr Mitchell's six principles, and his proposal for "parallel decommissioning".

Much attention has naturally focused on Mr Adams's position as president of Sinn Fein, on his authority, credibility and survivability. Political reality says Mr Trimble's career could equally come to an abrupt end, were he tempted to negotiate with Sinn Fein under threat of another bomb.

Mr Trimble is not so tempted. And he is certain to urge Mr Major to proceed with his political project, with or without Sinn Fein. Given the assumptions developed over the past 18 months, many will dismiss such talk as divorced from reality. But it goes to the heart of the dilemma now facing London and Dublin.

Mr Adams plainly requires Mr Bruton to start behaving like Mr Albert Reynolds. Mr Hume is evidently not ready to dismantle what remains of "the nationalist consensus". And for a while yet, the imperative will be to seek to define a political process which republicans might be prepared to rejoin.

But this is dangerous territory for two sovereign, legitimate governments. And the consequences will be profound should they ever decide that that is the only imperative.