Ireland has accepted the draft EU report, entitled Strengthening The Common European Security And Defence Policy, agreed at the summit in Feira, Portugal. It is timely therefore to reflect on what we have signed up to and to see if the Defence Forces can deliver on the promises made.
Before embarking on such considerations we should first of all put Feira in its overall context.
The EU which we joined in 1972 has changed dramatically over the years of our membership. One of the main engines driving this change has been gradual European integration.
We have seen it in agriculture, economic integration and the creation of the euro.
Given that the first steps towards the formation of this new Europe were driven by security concerns in the aftermath of the second World War, it is perhaps understandable that the current drive for integration is in the area of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
It is not the intention here to cover the foreign policy aspects. On security aspects, or the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), one must first point out that this is an essential part of overall development in foreign policy.
General European security poses little problem for the 11 EU member-states who are also members of Nato.
No real problem exists for European countries which are outside the EU but members of NATO (i.e. Norway and Turkey). And prospective EU members from eastern Europe are also either members of NATO or hope to join the alliance.
The four non-aligned countries, Austria, Sweden, Finland and Ireland, have problems in this area. They must see exactly how they fit into the overall framework, how they can contribute while remaining outside the NATO club.
Membership of Partnership for Peace (PfP) provides some linkage, but other more meaningful solutions must be developed.
Sweden, Finland and Austria have been pursuing some ideas which must be of direct interest to Ireland.
Ireland, however, has contributed little to the debate. Certainly there has been no public discussion on the matter in this country.
This probably has more to do with avoiding perceived controversy at a time when an election is on the horizon.
The Government has told the people the issue is on the backburner, and there is no need for us to do anything as yet. In the meantime we will be pursuing with enthusiasm the other pillar of the ESDI, response for the Petersberg Tasks.
Our partners do not share our apathy. They see European security as an essential element of the EU. They seek an accommodation which they hope will suit all members whatever their security policy. Since we will never be able to afford an army, air force or blue-water navy to guarantee our own security, we will always be dependent on others to provide it. During the second World War and the Cold War, we declared ourselves neutral.
We never, however, raised forces capable of defending that policy. Instead we depended on the allies and NATO to provide cover for us at no cost.
This will no longer work. We may find partners less willing to accommodate us in other areas, or indeed we may find ourselves provided with security and charged for the privilege.
A calm and reasoned debate on these issues must take place. Our politicians must inform and trust those who have elected them.
This leaves us with the second pillar of ESDI. How are we performing here? Will our Defence Forces be capable of delivering on our responsibilities towards the EU's Rapid Reaction Force?
The concept of this 50,000- to 60,000-strong force was first unveiled at the Helsinki summit over six months ago.
The EU set itself a goal to be capable, by 2003, of developing an autonomous capacity to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Operations may not require a UN mandate, although this would be ideal.
The force must be capable of operating across the full range of Petersberg Tasks; in other words it may be involved in low-intensity observer missions or in high-profile enforcement missions.
The force will not be a standing European army, as such an organisation is unnecessary and wasteful of resources.
What is envisaged is an amalgam of units pledged by members, organised in operational brigades and ready for deployment on 60 days' notice into an area of operations under a multinational headquarters.
In all but the most low-profile of operations, the headquarters is envisaged as being provided from NATO resources.
The strength of the force is seen as being of up to 50,000 to 60,000 personnel. It is required to be at 60 days notice to move to an area of operation, be capable of being sustained on the ground for at least a year, be properly trained and equipped and be capable of being deployed from the home country into the Area of Operations.
What will be expected of Ireland? How many troops and what category of soldier will be expected from this country? In the absence of any direction from government, this is hard to tell.
However, based on our GDP, size of population and other criteria, our contribution would involve somewhere between 800 and 1,000 soldiers.
Can the Defence Forces provide this? Certainly they can supply 800 to 1,000 personnel, but this is without the sustainability requirement. To sustain a group of this size in theatre for at least 12 months requires a base of 2,400 to 3,000.
With an Army strength of approximately 7,000, this should be achievable on the face of it. There are, however, impediments which must be considered.
Our Border commitments are about 1,000 soldiers located in seven military posts. The current peace climate, in theory at least, could eventually lead to major savings here, but it is not so simple in Ireland. The British army can withdraw to England and leave its Border posts abandoned.
South of the Border one must ask if our politicians will agree to close the seven Border posts involved. If not, then the troops are required for wasteful housekeeping duties.
At any one time we also have approximately 800 soldiers serving on UN peacekeeping missions. This also requires a multiplier. The Defence White Paper, despite praising our support for the UN, sought to balance the books by suggesting a withdrawal from Lebanon.
The military must strike a balance between the morale-boosting exercise of having troops actually serving abroad with the UN and being on standby at home for the RRF.
The new army must accept that it exists for service overseas. Under the Defence Act amendment of 1960, soldiers can be sent abroad as a matter of course. Over the past 40 years, however, they have been allowed to volunteer and go or stay as they pleased. Certain categories have been detailed to go overseas on occasion. Soldiers who cannot or will not serve overseas will be of little use to this army and must be attracted out of the Defence Forces.
Finally we have the latest 10 per cent reduction in the Army as a result of the recent White Paper. This has required a major reorganisation which will take some time to work through.
The cut also came without any commitment to further barracks closures. Indeed the Minister's announcement of a £1 million building programme for Clonmel, one of the barracks under threat, can only be viewed against the background of the Tipperary South by-election. The difficulties are sizeable but given proper support and political will, the Defence Forces will be capable of filling the bill.
On the matter of whether we can supply troops fully trained to undertake the full range of Petersberg Tasks, the situation is more clearcut. Our experience in, and ongoing training for, peacekeeping duties is a distinct advantage at the lower level of operational intensity.
Training for the more high-intensity enforcement duties is part of a soldier's normal training, but it will take time for us to train to a level where we can seamlessly fit our unit into a multinational operational brigade. Such training will also involve participation in exercises with potential partners. NATO The final requirement of deployability cannot be exercised by the Defence Forces. Our Air Corps is not a conventional air force and does not have the necessary fleet. This is, however, true of other smaller partners. This is why the planners foresee the use of NATO assets for such tasks. These assets may be used on a repayment basis or may be available gratis.
These developments are not some distant wish list which will never be achieved. Major advances will occur during the French presidency this year, ahead of the Nice summit of December. Most important will be the Pledging Conference fixed for next October. At this meeting Ireland will be held to account for its troop contribution and preparatory programmes.
This is a short four months away.
Lieut Gen Gerry McMahon is a former chief-of-staff of the Defence Forces
