The European Union embarked yesterday on a new adventure: that of creating a strong, highly mobile military force, capable of intervening in any future crisis on the continent.

True, the decisions taken this week are mere paper exercises. No new military force is being created; the troops pledged are the same military forces which already exist in Europe. No new equipment is going to be purchased either, at least not in the near future. Nor is the force truly European; individual governments retain their control over national contributions.

For the moment, the exercise is purely political. It is designed to persuade a new United States administration that Europe is serious about its defence responsibilities. And it is creating a new, informal division of responsibilities among EU member states: those who contribute most to this force will also have a bigger say on defence matters in the future. But, apart from this, almost everything else still needs to be decided.

The problems with Europe's security arrangements remain huge. The continent is messy: some countries inside the EU continue to adhere to a policy of military neutrality, while some important European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation are not in the EU.

Europe's governments work on the assumption that they will be able to use NATO's military assets in any future operation. But nobody knows how a new US administration will react to such proposals, and what the formal link between NATO and the EU will be.

Finally, everybody claims the effort can be accomplished without spending more on the military. Taken together, all these obstacles appear insurmountable. In fact, given the right political will, they can all be addressed fairly quickly.

It will be wrong to exclude countries such as Poland, Turkey or Norway from European arrangements: they are not only important states, but also occupy key strategic positions on the continent. Yet, the creation of a European military force offers these countries the best mechanism for an informal but nevertheless significant link.

It is relatively easy to reach agreements whereby these states will contribute their troops to the European force. Furthermore, the creation of a European defence capability will offer other countries a new security. The Baltic states may never join NATO, but stand a good chance of joining the EU in the near future, and will obtain a security guarantee through the back door.

So, far from creating a new division in Europe, as some critics allege, the start of a European force offers the possibility of expanding continental security. The link between the EU and NATO will remain crucial to the success of this scheme. But, paradoxically, it is precisely because there is never going to be an identical number of member states in both organisations that NATO and the EU will be condemned to co-operating with each other.

Europeans will need to spend more money on their military capabilities. For the moment, the omens are not good: governments continue to pretend that they will simply squeeze more out of existing defence budgets, and Germany greeted the new European military plan by announcing a large cut in its defence budget for next year.

But there are signs of optimism. The decisions taken in Brussels yesterday are merely the start of a planning process which will take years, and which will commit European governments to buying new transport and fighter aircraft, as well as new communications systems. Once governments are tied to joint projects, it will be almost impossible for any single country to withdraw from such procurement decisions. The military in EU states is about to acquire protection from future budgetary cuts.

But there is one critical area which is yet to be tackled, and which the EU continues to ignore at its peril: that of democratic control over the entire defence process.

The British, who spearheaded the current initiative, deliberately kept it vague, in order to avoid a drawnout discussion about decision-making bodies and new voting procedures. The tactic succeeded: for the last two years, Europe concentrated on military capabilities, rather than bureaucratic creations.

But Europe is already paying a price for this approach: a myriad of new, ad-hoc bodies have been created in Brussels, all of which have some share in the process of reaching military decisions, but none of which is democratically accountable.

Theoretically, national governments continue to be accountable to their parliaments for military affairs. In practice, this arrangement is a recipe for future political scandals.

Europe's military decisions are likely to come as a result of secret compromises between many states. By the time parliaments will be invited to debate a crisis, the decision on what needs to be done would have already been taken; Europe's elected representatives will merely be informed of what is about to be done, and they will have no ability to change the policy.

FURTHERMORE, since any military planning requires a clear knowledge of what troops are available, defence ministers will have to pledge their troops fairly early. Once this is done, it will be impossible to withhold participation without risking a collapse of an entire operation.

And joint European military equipment decisions, with their historic record of going over-budget, will provide the source of even more political scandals. The key test for European defence will therefore be how to anchor the structures in a proper system of democratic control.

The Dutch government has taken the initiative of demanding that some of the newly created defence institutions, such as the little-understood Political and Security Committee, should be anchored in a new treaty. Other governments are not persuaded, preferring instead the creation of a new and toothless parliamentary assembly, or a defence committee of the European Parliament.

So, yet again, Europe is building new institutions above the heads of its nations. It will have only itself to blame if, when the time comes for a new military operation, the EU discovers that it does not have the necessary popular support.

Democratic accountability is the key to Europe's new military initiative. And it is precisely here that the EU has persistently failed to deliver in the past.

Jonathan Eyal is director of studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London