AFTER more than two years, in office, President Nelson Mandela still feels the burden of fame derived from the legendary status bestowed on him during in his 28 year sojourn in prison.
His reputation as a miracle worker persists in the eyes of many South Africans, even as he begins to look forward to retirement in 1999 and to assuming a less onerous role as South Africa's elder statesman. "There are still people who expect me to do more than is humanly possible," Mr Mandela remarked during an exclusive interview with The Irish Times.
I invited the white haired Mr Mandela, who was inaugurated as South Africa's first black President at a spectacular ceremony attended by the world's political luminaries, to assess his presidency at the halfway mark of his five year term of office.
He has little hesitation in listing its positive achievements: reversing the outward flow of capital, converting a negative economic growth rate into a positive one, curtailing inflation, reducing politically motivated violence, and fostering the emergence of a new patriotism reaching across the old barriers of race and tribe. On the last point, Mr Mandela notes proudly: "A country which was split from top to bottom by racial tension has become a miracle of the world."
He is particularly pleased by the positive contribution to nascent patriotism by the white, coloured and Indian minorities, who had viewed the prospect of rule by the black majority with apprehension.
On the negative side, he concedes without prompting that crime is "unacceptably high" and a matter of great concern. The septuagenarian patriarch - he turned 78 in July - adds: "We can no longer blame the apartheid government. The ANC has been in power for two years.
He believes, however, that the rising crime rate - rated by most South Africans as the country's major problem and, by implication, the ANC led government's most conspicuous failure - should be seen in the context of the decline in political violence. Noting that the deployment of special police task units in KwaZulu Natal has reduced political violence sharply in that province, he is convinced that the same formula will succeed against crime.
Even as he speaks, police stations in and around Johannesburg are being reinforced by 1,000 extra policemen brought in from less turbulent areas. Their task is to help rid the city of its reputation as the crime capital of the world.
BUT WHAT of the declining rand, which has lost more than one fifth of its value against the US dollar since mid February? Mr Mandela responds with a calm which borders on complacency, perhaps because the best way of dealing with the crisis is to remain composed.
Contending that at 3.5 to the dollar the rand was overvalued, he adds that the US currency's appreciation against the rand was compounded speculation over his health. He is confident that the declining rate is a temporary problem: "We have a very capable Minister of Finance. We have a very capable governor of the Reserve Bank. They are confident. They are cool. They assure me that they have everything under control."
Questions on the problems confronting his administration are met with the same apparent imperturbability. His training as a lawyer and his many years as a prisoner seem to be relevant, his legal training manifesting itself in his logicality, his incarceration in his patience.
The point is best illustrated by his replies on the problem posed for the ANC by the reluctance of its major partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party, to accept the ANC's new macroeconomic strategy, which includes plans to privatise or partly privatise state owned corporations.
Mr Mandela recalls that it took him four years to persuade South Africa's white government to negotiate with the ANC, from his meeting with former president P.W. Botha in July 1986 to the start of negotiations in May 1990. Referring to the ANC's discussions with its allies on the macroeconomic plan, Mr Mandela says: "We are showing the same patience which we showed in dealing with our enemies".
A problem of a different order concerns the Shell House massacre of March 28th, 1994, the day on which ANC guards opened fire on Zulu protest marchers, killing eight and seriously wounding 20, The ANC in general and Mr Mandela in particular have been sharply criticised for the killings outside its national headquarters in Johannesburg.
A specific point of criticism of Mr Mandela - dubbed the "Butcher of Shell House" by his more rabid political foes - is that he waited more than 14 months before publicly admitting that he ordered the guards to defend ANC lives and property by all means, including, if necessary, shooting to kill.
Explaining why he waited so long, Mr Mandela says: "My own principal strategy is never to fight on a battleground ground chosen by the enemy. If you rush in, you can come to grief."
Mr Mandela's strategic consideration is underpinned by a conviction that there was a conspiracy between the police and the organisers of the march, local Inkatha Freedom Party leaders, to use the protest as a cover to attack Shell House and kill ANC leaders there.
He avers that it was only when he had "proof of the plot" that he decided to go public. Referring to his statement to the Senate in June 1995, he says: "At a place and time that I considered suitable for our strategy I made the statement."
He declares confidently: "There will never be a successful prosecution of the ANC because Inkatha lawyers have now admitted what we have been saying - that they (the marchers) were sent to Shell House by the police."
