There are clear indications that security, common defence policy and even common defence are being discussed seriously at EU level. These include the meeting of foreign and defence ministers in Brussels today; the appointment of Javier Solana, the former secretary-general of NATO, as supremo of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) for the EU and now as Secretary-General of the WEU as well; the Cologne declaration; the St Malo declaration; and the three wise men's report on future EU evolution.

That the Irish Government has participated in these discussions and acquiesced in these developments without adequate discussion at home shows that it has learned nothing from its mishandling of Partnership for Peace (PfP) and that security and defence policy is being made in an unplanned way.

Furthermore, it is being done in a way likely to cause maximum suspicion among the electorate and without any explanation to the Dail. In contrast, Danish ministers clear all important EU policy decisions in advance with parliamentary committees.

The Government has promised a White Paper on defence, but it is clear from ministerial briefings that they do not intend to address of any of the above issues in that paper. The paper is to address the issue of restructuring of the Defence Forces with "some" international dimension. So much for transparency and accountability.

Fine Gael favoured Partnership for Peace through the front door, and not through any side entrance while the public looked the other way. We set out our position in the 1996 foreign policy White Paper; we also published a policy document on PfP in January 1998. We believe that the way to pursue foreign and security policy is to put the issues properly before the people; the pros and cons of Irish policy should be set out and articulated.

As EU security and defence policy evolves, this, too, should be articulated at home. Regrettably, Ministers continue to run away from proactively developing policy in this area or even explaining proposals or developments to the public. This state of affairs cannot be allowed to continue.

Following the passing of the Amsterdam Treaty, if Ireland were to join an EU defence community we would:

have to do so in accordance with Article N of the Maastricht Treaty, which means there would have to be an inter-governmental conference.

there would have to be unanimous approval by the European Council.

each member-state would have to approve the proposal in accordance with their constitutional requirements, i.e. there would have to be a referendum in Ireland.

These provisions might give us some element of comfort. However, the rules on security and defence will be set by EU states whether Ireland participates in the decision-making or not. It is likely that, just like EMU, the rules will be made by the willing, and those joining later will have to take on the rules of the game as established. Crucial in all of this is the Article V commitment of the WEU treaty, which reads as follows:

"If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power."

The effect of this Article V commitment is that an attack on one WEU state must automatically be met with all the military and other aid and assistance in the power of every other WEU state.

If such an article were to be incorporated in some future EU treaty, then every state signed up to that treaty would automatically lose its right to decide whether to become involved and would be bound by these provisions.

It may well be that not all EU members would sign up for treaty defence provisions from the start, but just like EMU, the rules will have been cast in stone and changing them later would be extremely difficult.

For that reason Ireland should fully participate from the beginning in any negotiations to redraft treaty provisions in the security, defence policy or common defence area.

Even if we do not intend signing up for these provisions at this time, we should seek to ensure that any Article V type commitment is not incorporated as a full treaty provision but is instead inserted as a protocol to the treaty. A protocol could be drafted so as to allow each member-state decide for itself which common defence issues it wishes to become involved in.

Our concern in Ireland should not be to shirk our responsibilities or to refuse to come to the aid of a partner EU state. Our concern should be to ensure that should we do so it will be by our own decision rather than automatic provision.

Northern Ireland has been a part of NATO since 1949. Following the Good Friday agreement, constitutional provisions are being installed which in time may require us to take full cognisance of that fact. In time we will also have to take full account of the changing EU security architecture. By becoming one of the architects now we would best serve Irish interests.

We can only become one of the architects, helping to design a future Europe that is secure, stable and prosperous, if we bring the people us. This is not a case of whether we should or should not have a referendum: this must happen in any event.

It is a case of whether we are prepared to honestly put our cards on the table, set out all the alternatives openly and then work strategically to try to bring about the policy which we want for Ireland and for Europe. That is why the promised White Paper on defence should address the Irish and European challenges which lie ahead. Anything short of that would be a disservice to the public.

Gay Mitchell TD is a Fine Gael spokesman on foreign affairs and was minister for European affairs 1994-97.