Life and death lessons from Fastnet

Next weekend marks the 25th anniversary of the Fastnet race tragedy, which claimed 15 lives, and provides an opportunity to review…

Next weekend marks the 25th anniversary of the Fastnet race tragedy, which claimed 15 lives, and provides an opportunity to review the lessons learned, writes David O'Brien

Listing off the lessons learned from Fastnet '79 in the hope that some good can come out of tragedy is a sensible approach to seamanship but ultimately it is only when sailors realise they are no match for the power of the sea can the prospect of further disasters be averted.

Storm sailing claimed its individual casualties long before the Fastnet but the fact that so many people died in so many different yachts led to international demands to find out what went wrong when a summer gale became a killer 25 years ago this weekend.

For a period of 24 hours, 2,500 yachtsmen on 303 boats were pounded by 40 foot waves. By the time the race was over 15 crew had died, 24 had abandoned ship, five yachts had sunk, 136 were rescued and only 85 boats finished.

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When yacht stability began to surface as a major issue, a number of tank test studies were undertaken on the relatively unknown capsize potential of modern yachts in large seaways. The fact that it was not wind but breaking waves that proved the biggest threat to survival was a significant finding in skippers' logs.

In one of the worst stories of the tragedy imaginable, two crew were lost when trapped in the cockpit of an inverted yacht, the yacht was rolled through 180 degrees by big seas and remained inverted for three to five minutes.

Exhausted crew extricated the skipper by cutting his harness. He was then swept away and lost. Another crew member, who had remained in the cockpit throughout the capsize, died some time later. Building on these accounts and in a new era of designs since then, it had been hoped the days of boats with limits of positive stability of 110 degrees were gone but the experience of the Sydney-Hobart yacht race disaster 19 years later threw up little evidence to support progress.

According to the coroner's report into that race, Business Post and Naiad, the 40-footer which rolled over in the Tasman Sea, had a limit of positive stability of just 104.7 degrees. A subsequent Yachting World article led technical expert Matthew Sheahan to conclude that that finding alone, never mind repeated life raft failures, was a disturbing indication of how little has really been taken on board in the years of offshore sailing since the Fastnet.

It's a view endorsed by naval architect Rob Doyle, of the Ron Holland design office in Cork, who says that in spite of a broad sweep of improvements being made in terms of harness and hatch design, better hull shapes and stronger deck gear, the possibility of another disaster remains largely because of a return to the dangerous obsession in some quarters of putting performance ahead of stability.

The Royal Ocean Racing Club, the club that runs the Fastnet race, screens new designs to ensure racing yachts have a minimum stability rating. Such checks are also contained in the EU recreational craft directive (RCD) that operates here and, since its January 2003 introduction, it has helped in the building of safer offshore yachts.

But as Sheahan notes: "Waving a design category approval at the weather will not help you, if you run into problems at sea."

The yacht club also pioneered research into sea anchors, developed to keep bows straight into the waves and other devices, known as drogues, were designed to slow boats running with the wind.

Yet John Rousmaniere, the author of the book, Fastnet Force 10, agrees with Sheahan: "People sometimes say that one tactic or piece of gear is 'always' right, regardless of the boat and the conditions. There is nothing 'always' about a storm at sea, except its danger."

And being realistic about limitations in the event of bad weather has perhaps been the biggest lesson for both crews and race organisers. Gone are the bravado days where old sea dogs would never don lifejackets.

As recently as two months ago, Wicklow Sailing Club found itself in the long shadow of the Fastnet disaster when, on the eve of the Round Ireland race start, it faced skippers looking for news of postponement as a low-pressure system, more akin to a November gale, lumbered towards the race course.

Wicklow clearly showed its understanding of the meteorological lessons when it postponed the start of the 13th race, for the first time in its 24 year history, to allow south-easterly gales to abate.

Ever mindful of just what a force 10, 60 knot wind can do, officials these days have much less a stomach for sending crews out into the teeth of a gale. "My thinking was that a short delay would benefit everyone. Safety is our priority and I always have the Fastnet and Sydney-Hobart tragedies in the back of my mind," race officer Dennis Noonan told The Irish Times. It's not always a clear cut decision to postpone, however, and under the international racing rules of sailing the decision to go to sea ultimately rests with the skipper himself. And 25 years ago this weekend 303 skippers gave that rule its ultimate test.

One of those to finish in '79 was class IV winner, Cork yachtsman Donal McClement. He was at the helm of Black Arrow when the fine weather start to the race on August 11th suddenly turned nasty as the fleet entered the western approaches. Directly as a result of experiences in that race and from his work as a helicopter search and rescue navigator, he maintains that life rafts should not be called such.

Instead, he says, they should be known only as "emergency" rafts. He argues that only if the yacht is sinking beneath you should you think about the raft. It turns out that many who died gave up the relative protection of the yacht and resorted to the life raft far too quickly. It's no accident therefore that McClement's advice that you should never step down into a life raft, but always "step up", is now part of modern sea safety drills.

The official inquiry, to which McClement contributed, found rafts had capsized, others had fallen apart on inflation. Most of all however, the inquiry revealed how sick, cold and tired sailors can make fatal mistakes.

David O'Brien is Sailing Correspondent of The Irish Times and editor of Afloat magazine.