New style of war emerging, post-Balkans

After years of disappointed, sometimes apocalyptic, prophecy by air war visionaries, air power has won a war by itself without…

After years of disappointed, sometimes apocalyptic, prophecy by air war visionaries, air power has won a war by itself without nuclear weapons. That, some would argue, is the future pattern and the main lesson of Kosovo.

Kosovo may prove to be a turning point. It is argued that mass armies, high casualties, huge logistical organisations and many expensive weapon "platforms" - tanks, self-propelled artillery and warships - could become obsolete.

Cruise/Tomahawk missiles, combined with aircraft equipped with precision bombs, missiles and real-time communications will break an enemy's will to fight and ease the job of ground forces.

Armed forces spend long periods in training and comparatively short periods in combat. It is important to analyse the lessons of current wars correctly. Investigations have started.

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The civilian deaths and collateral damage show the accuracy required for a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is not yet available. Allegedly, exaggerated claims for bombing successes against Serb ground forces were made. Very few damaged tanks came out of Kosovo. When journalists flooded in, the expected pictures of destroyed equipment did not emerge.

Tanks, artillery and vehicles can remain concealed and unscathed as long as they don't try to do anything. Movement under enemy air supremacy invites destruction. But aerial bombing cannot stop ethnic cleansing by foot policemen with rifles.

The strategic bombing of targets such as bridges, factories and oil installations is said to have been poorly planned and executed, but it did great damage. This, and Russia's withdrawal of diplomatic support, were decisive.

Media relations may need review. A few letters to the press called for "good old-fashioned censorship". This seems unlikely to happen. The Daily Telegraph was strongly critical during the campaign, claiming the bombing was not working and suggesting the replacement of Gen Wesley Clark, the NATO Supreme Commander.

Just before Serbia's capitulation, a headline called the bombing "incompetent swatting from above the clouds". Another English newspaper called Britain "America's lap-dog". Some of this may have stemmed from covert anti-Americanism in parts of the British press.

A Committee of Permanent Under-Secretaries considered long-term questions of foreign policy in 1949. They concluded that "the cornerstone of British foreign policy" should be the cultivation of good relations with the US. The only serious deviation from this (Suez in 1956) proved disastrous. Some resentment remains, breaking out at times like this, but the official policy seems likely to continue.

The Royal Air Force suffered severe reductions in recent years. Lacking "stand-off" and smart bombs, it concentrated on low-level flying beneath radar coverage. Steady pilots and many training hours were required. Even Mrs Thatcher queried the subsequent Gulf War losses.

Laser-guided bombs were then used. They proved unable to remain locked on targets that were obscured by clouds or smoke from previous strikes. Jane's Defence Weekly says the Iraqis and Serbs have used simple smoke pots to block laser-guided bombs.

NATO was equipped and trained for the uncertain north-western European weather, so it was surprising to find that problems arose in the Mediterranean area. "Unfavourable" days, laser-guided bombs and cancelled strike sorties upset plans.

Bombing through the clouds was authorised for RAF Harrier aircraft. Cluster and "dumb" (unguided) bombs were then used, with little apparent success. They were dropped from 15,000ft to avoid Serb air defences - too high for accuracy.

The London Times has bluntly referred to the RAF's plane shortage and "lack of any weapon system guaranteed to destroy Serb tanks", a frustrating situation for a proud force that once launched 1,000 bomber raids.

The Americans have all-weather bombing capabilities with satellite Global Positioning Systems (GPS). The elegant technology of laser guidance is fascinating but it has proved less effective than the somewhat simpler GPS. The Americans reinforced success by making greater use of the comparatively cheap ($20,000$25,000) GPS Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which works with a variety of bombs.

Already there is talk of GPS jamming and anti-jamming. The old, visible weapons race is now fought out in secrecy and electronic sophistication.

Production of JDAMs was greatly increased as NATO countries sought them. Conventional air-launched cruise missiles also ran short. This may indicate that NATO expected a very brief war. Reports say that NATO members are being told that they must equip themselves properly.

Many other lessons have emerged. Cruise and Tomahawk (ship-launched) missiles have been generally accurate and reliable. To ensure this continues, more satellites and improved signal strengths will be required. The dangers of jamming and of attacks on the satellites themselves will need attention. Global positioning is now a huge civilian business. Meeting military and commercial requirements won't be easy, or cheap.

"Real-time targeting" has not been achieved. This is the transmission of target pictures directly from satellites or surveillance aircraft to the fighter pilots and missile controllers as the action is happening. Ability to switch cruise missile targeting in flight is sought. There will be many calls on the US Air Force budgets. The budget for year 2000 seems to be $79 billion. Britain's total defence budget for 1998 was $37.2 billion.

The Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo have raised questions about the combat viability of small air forces. The Serbs had about 80 modern fighters, including 15 excellent Mig-29s. Heavily outnumbered, they could hardly take off. Many were destroyed on the ground.

Only two NATO aircraft were lost. The crews were saved by an efficient American recovery organisation. For the same number of aircraft and sorties one might see more losses in training.

Concentrating the NATO ground force was rather slow. The Americans, in particular, propose to improve this with a "middle-weight strike force".

By-passing the UN sets a bad precedent. Americans chafing against the UN Charter might remember that Americans wrote it.