THE constitutional provisions on education are located on an ideological fault line in the Irish Constitution. While the principal Article here, Art.42, is clearly derived from Catholic social teaching, the other pertinent provisions, such as the prohibition on endowment of religion by the State or the protection of a child's right not to attend religious instruction at publicly funded schools, trace their lineage back to liberal legislation of the late 19th century.

Yesterday's decision by Mr Justice Costello is the first judicial attempt to consider the interaction of these two value systems in the context of education.

The issue before the court was a net one could the State legitimately pay the salaries of chaplains employed in community and comprehensive schools? The plaintiffs did not dispute the right of schools to employ chaplains privately, nor did they dispute the right of the State to finance programmes of religious education which seek to broaden the students' knowledge of religious matters.

Rather they challenged the right of the State to finance programmes of religious instruction or formation, designed to instil religious values in students, arguing that this was contrary to the constitutional prohibition on State endowment of religion.

In deciding that the State could pay the salaries of school chaplains, the judge relied on Art.42.4 which, among other things, allows the State to assist private educational enterprises, provided it has due regard for the rights of parents, especially in relation to religious and moral formation.

From this, he concluded that the State is entitled to assist parents in relation to the religious and moral formation of their children. Reading the non endowment principle in the light of this finding, he held that the State funding of school chaplains did not constitute an endowment of religion.

The practice of reading one constitutional provision in the light of another is an acceptable approach to the interpretation of the Constitution, often referred to as the "doctrine of harmonious interpretation". However, this decision highlights the significance which attaches to the selection of one's starting point.

Here, Mr Justice Costello began with an examination of the State's powers, to assist private educational initiative and then used this analysis to qualify the principle of non endowment. Had he begun with an examination of the principle of non endowment and used that to qualify the State's powers to support private education, the outcome might well have been different.

One might plausibly argue that the non endowment principle was designed to respect the interests of taxpayers that their money should not be spent in support of religious beliefs with which they did not agree and that consequently the State's power to support education should not be pushed to the point where the State was actively promoting a particular religious belief in which case the State funding of school chaplains would be unlawful.

Be that as it may, yesterday's decision has at least two further implications for education. First, it removes one of the constitutional doubts surrounding the "integrated curriculum", i.e. the holistic approach to education whereby religious values permeate the entire curriculum. In the light of Mr Justice Costello's decision, one cannot argue that such a system amounts to an unconstitutional endowment of religion.

There may still be constitutional difficulties for this system, having regard to Art.44.2.4 which safeguards the right of a pupil to attend a publicly funded school without having to receive religious instruction.

However, it might be argued that this right only applied to classes of religious instruction and that it was not infringed by the study of say, religiously inspired literature in English class.

Second, his decision, read in the light of the State's constitutional obligation not to discriminate between the religious denominations, raises the prospect that schools other than community or comprehensive schools may be able to demand State funding for chaplains.

IT IS even conceivable that parents may be able to seek financial support for programmes of religious formation outside the school systems. For example, minority faith which is not represented in the educational system, could the parents not argue that, in order to ensure parity of treatment with the larger denominations, the State is obliged to provide someone to support the parents in their attempts to provide for the religious and moral formation of their children? In which case, the State may face difficult questions surrounding the definition of religion.

A philosophical tension exists at the heart of our Constitution between the value systems of liberal democracy and Catholic social teaching. The past two decades have witnessed a steady advance of the secular, liberal perspective.

Yesterday's decision, however, proves that the tension still retains its vitality.