THE Provisional Reports of the Constitution Review Group published recently, deal mainly with technical matters and are unlikely to generate much public controversy.

However, some of the findings should give rise to concern about the extent to which our democratic system is truly representative. And they provide an important context for the discussion of an issue in our political system - the proper role of the courts in relation to the formulation of social policy.

A number of very sensible suggestions are made in relation to Article 26, which details the procedures whereby the President may refer a Bill to the Supreme Court for a decision as to its constitutionality. In: particular, the Review Group recommends that Supreme Court judges should be allowed to given concurring and dissenting opinions in such cases. It calls also for the abolition of the immunity from further constitutional challenge, which currently attaches to an Act constitutionally proofed in this way.

In similar vein, the reports suggest that the office of the Ombudsman be put on a constitutional footing; that the Attorney General be allowed to delegate some of his functions to another senior lawyer; and that the President and members of the Council of State should be given the option of making either a declaration or an affirmation on taking office, so as to ensure proper respect for their conscientious beliefs.

SIGNIFICANTLY, in relation to the office of Presidency, the Review Group is anxious that the office be kept above party politics, and to that end, opposes any increase in the President's role in relation to the formation of a new government.

Consideration is also given to the President's existing power to refuse to dissolve the Dail on the advice of a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain the support of a majority of deputies. This potentially important power has never been exercised but has generated some debate's as to the appropriate circumstances in which it should be invoked.

However, as this issue is interlinked with Article 28, in respect of which the Review Group has not yet reported, we do not get any clear, indication of what the group is likely to recommend. In passing, one might register mild surprise at Provisional Reports' failure to attend to two defects in the constitutional provisions relating to the Presidency, namely, the failure to prescribe a mode of resignation, and the restrictive nature of the powers to provide for the replacement of the President.

An interesting theme which underpins some of the recommendations is a concern to tackle the so called "democratic deficit". To that end, the reports call for a relaxation of the current restrictive procedures for nominating presidential candidates and reject calls for an extension of the Government's powers in the conduct of international relations.

For the same reason, they oppose any extension of the constitutional immunity currently attaching to legislation enacted pursuant to our obligations as members of the European Union or Communities. There are limits, however, to how far the Review Group will go in the interests of democratisation, as it recommends against giving the electorate the power to amend the Constitution directly by means of a popular initiative (i.e. without having to have recourse to the Oireachtas at all), taking the view that this may give rise to inadequate or undesirable amendments and many fruitless and expensive referendums.

IN some respects, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Provisional Reports is the section dealing with elections to Dail Eireann. This is because research commissioned by the Review Group reveals how the better off in our society are disproportionately represented in the Dail. Thus professional workers, employers, managers and salaried employees constitute only 19 per cent of the entire population but a startling 76 per cent of the members of the Dail - 126 TDs. In contrast, only three TDs are drawn from the ranks of the agricultural and manual workers, who constitute 35 per cent of the population.

These figures should hopefully provoke debate on a number of different fronts - I wish to concentrate here on one issue to which the Review Group may be returning in its final report, namely, the proper role of the judiciary in our constitutional and political order.

Attempts to secure social change through the courts, which have become increasingly frequent over the past 20 years or so, are sometimes decried on the ground that they are fundamentally undemocratic.

Social change, it is said, should be left to the Oireachtas which embodies the democratic will of the and should not be entrusted to a judiciary who are not accountable, to the electorate.

No one doubts the value of democratically accountable policy making and where desirable social change can be achieved through the political process, then clearly recourse to the Oireachtas is the preferred option. However, marginalised groups such as travellers, for example, can legitimately complain that the political process is not responsive to their needs and that they have no option but to seek protection of their interests through the courts.

At this point the question becomes: to what extent ought the value of democratically accountable policy making be compromised and in the service of what other values?

The figures produced by the Review Group reinforce the doubts which many may have about the responsiveness of the political system to the legitimate demands of the poor and disadvantaged of our society and weaken the case against judicial activism.