We read that Messrs Burke and Redmond are under pressure - blessedly vague word - to co-operate with the Flood tribunal. What form might this pressure take? Let us consider a few possibilities.

The first and most likely candidate stems from the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) (Amendment) Act 1997, which was enacted because of loopholes in the law which became evident at the time of Mr Charles Haughey's defiance of the McCracken tribunal.

This law states that any person may be ordered by the tribunal to pay any other person's legal costs. The grounds on which this order may be made are: "Where a tribunal is of the opinion that, having regard to the findings of the tribunal and all other relevant matters (including failing to co-operate with or provide assistance to, or knowingly giving false information to, the tribunal), there are sufficient reasons rendering it equitable to do so."

At the commencement of the Flood tribunal, the chairman made it clear that he would use his powers under this provision so that parties who did not co-operate before the tribunal could not rely on the sort of generosity which flowed from the beef tribunal. Moreover, as can be seen from the quotation, the power could extend not only to a refusal to order the State to pay (say) Mr Burke's or Mr Redmond's costs but even requiring them to pay other costs.

For a further extension made by the 1997 Act was that the costs order could cover the tribunal's own lawyers.

Secondly, the word "immunity" has been used very freely in the media. The usual sense in which this would be understood might be immunity from prosecution, downstream, of those against whom the tribunal has found misconduct. This seems rather unlikely. The position is that the Director of Public Prosecutions bears the full authority to decide whether to take a prosecution for an indictable offence - that is those more serious crimes, usually triable before a jury - and it is such a crime which would be involved here.

If there is sufficient evidence to do so, almost invariably the DPP does launch a prosecution. Thus if the tribunal were bargaining with a witness and offering immunity, it could only meaningfully do so if it had the DPP's authority. Given that this is a door which could open very wide - and according to the Sunday Tribune, such immunity has only been granted twice in the past 20 years - it seems most unlikely that such an offer is being made.

The third possibility is that there might be a prosecution for an offence, established by the Tribunals of Inquiry Act 1979. This makes it a crime if a person "by act or omission, obstructs or hinders the tribunal in the performance of its functions".

The inclusion of "omission" is significant, since the criminal law usually proceeds on the basis that: "Thou shalt not kill; but needst not strive officiously to keep alive." The pertinent point is that the word "omission" would certainly cover some of the behaviour of certain parties at the start of the Flood tribunal.

This provision, for which the maximum punishment is two years and/or a £10,000 fine, is also the one for which Mr Haughey is currently being tried for his non-co-operation with the McCracken tribunal.

A wide area of legal territory exists as to the mutual impact of a tribunal and a court which are considering essentially the same misconduct. This is largely unexplored country since there have been very few prosecutions for misconduct which has already been investigated by a tribunal. However, certain points seem clear. First, evidence taken before a tribunal cannot be used directly in testimony before a court. However, in the real world, once such evidence is out in the open, it is much easier for the prosecution to replicate it before a court.

Next, what if an accused in criminal proceedings argues that he cannot receive a fair trial because the judge and/or jury will have been prejudiced by the publicity given to the tribunal? This was one of the many points raised, in anticipation, in the Goodman case taken against the beef tribunal.

The eminently sensible response of the Supreme Court was that this issue could be determined when it arose. e, "the horse doesn't jump till it reaches the stile". It is at that point that the criminal court would decide whether to terminate, or to postpone, the prosecution.

Since that case, we have had the ruling that it was acceptable to try Mr Z for indecent assault on Ms X. This ruling was made despite the massive publicity surrounding the X abortion travel order, granted three years earlier. So it seems that such a line of argument would fail.

The reverse possibility is that the criminal trial would be heard first. There is even less likelihood of any difficulty here, since the tribunal is not sitting with a jury and is not subject to such rigorous standards of fair play to the person whose conduct is under inquiry, as would be the case before a court.

All in all, at the tribunal, the plot thickens. David Gwynn Morgan is professor of law at UCC.