A multimedia show for the highest of stakes

THE US CASE: Why Iraq must be disarmed Colin Powell did not disappoint

THE US CASE: Why Iraq must be disarmed Colin Powell did not disappoint. With the atmosphere in the chamber like that of a courtroom, he gave a compelling presentation of the US case against Iraq. Conor O'Clery was there.

It was significant that the tapestry of Picasso's anti-war masterpiece Guernica was obscured yesterday morning by Security Council flags at the "stake-out" in the UN building, where foreign ministers pause to talk to reporters.

The talk was of imminent war, as council members walked past, heading for the Security Council chamber to hear the case against Iraq from US Secretary of State Colin Powell.

The atmosphere inside the crowded chamber was incongruously like that of a cocktail party at first. Almost everyone gravitated towards Colin Powell, the former soldier who has mastered the diplomatic art of shoulder-squeezing and the dual cheek-kissing, and gave a cold shoulder to Iraq's Mohammed Aldouri.

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When Powell, immaculate in dark power suit and pink tie, sat down at 10.30 a.m. to begin his delivery, the atmosphere changed abruptly to that of a courtroom about to hear a capital case.

It was as if Mr Powell had been sent to state the case for the prosecution and to call for the death sentence, and to warn that if he did not get the verdict he wanted, then the court of world opinion might itself have no future.

Directly behind him sat George Tenet, director of the CIA, his presence signalling that the intelligence Mr Powell would reveal was provided by professionals.

There was a high degree of anticipation that this historic occasion would match the day in the chamber during the Cuban missile crisis, when Adlai Stevenson dramatically produced spy pictures of Soviet installations in Cuba.

American officials had been seen lugging in silver metal cases containing recordings of transcripts and slides, and officials had erected a large screen for an interactive presentation.

Mr Powell did not disappoint, with a compelling, chilling, 1½ hour presentation, delivered with rapid-fire precision and much finger-stabbing, and spliced with recordings and spy photographs.

Exhibit 1 was a transcript of a conversation on November 26th last year between a colonel and a brigadier general of the elite Republican Guard. The chamber went quiet as the Arabic voices crackled from amplifiers, with simultaneous translation written on the screen.

"We have this modified vehicle," said the colonel, "What do we say if one of them sees it?" said the colonel. "You didn't get a modified ... you don't have a modified," replied an incredulous general.

The modified vehicle was a mobile chemical weapons lab, said Mr Powell.

Exhibit 2 was another recording in which an officer received specific instructions from a superior to destroy a message. Why did they want to destroy the message, Mr Powell asked.

Before his next flourish, Mr Powell recounted intelligence he said the US had received from defectors. Orders had been given to hide all correspondence connected with banned weapons, and scientists and documents were being driven around the country in cars to evade inspections.

He quoted "numerous human sources" to claim hard drives in computers had been replaced to mislead inspectors and a missile brigade was dispersed to various locations in western Iraq and hidden in groves of palm trees.

Then Mr Powell displayed exhibit 3, a spy picture of a site with four red squares around bunkers which "we know" housed chemical weapons. They knew because of "signature items" such as special guards and contamination vehicles.

But look, a later picture of the site showing it had been cleaned up just before inspectors arrived on December 22nd. The Iraqis, said Mr Powell, without any apparent irony, were using surveillance to find out the inspectors' plans.

"We saw this type of house-cleaning at close to 30 sites," he added, although he did not offer more pictures.

Other sources, the Secretary of State said, had told the US that Saddam Hussein had forced scientists to sign documents acknowledging they would be executed if they divulged information on banned weapons.

At one facility, scientists had ben ordered to stay at home to avoid having to talk to inspectors and their place had been taken by Iraqi agents.

Under Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1441, "false statements and omissions and failure by Iraq at any time" constituted a further material breach."By this standard I believe Iraq is in further breach of its obligations," said Mr Powell. "Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious consequences" envisaged in the resolution.

Then came the most theatrical moment. Iraq had 8,500 unaccounted for litres of anthrax, Mr Powell said. It was so potent that "less than a teaspoon" of anthrax had shut down the US Senate, and killed two postal workers.

To illustrate the point he held up by his finger tips a tiny phial containing a yellow substance - several council members visibly drew back.

This held a teaspoon-full, he said. Iraq had enough to "fill tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of teaspoons". He flashed up another spy picture, exhibit 4, to show chemical weapons site in July that had been bulldozed before inspectors got to it.

Then he played exhibit 5, another taped conversation in which a Capt Ibrahim gave instructions to another officer to remove the expression '"nerve agents" wherever it came up in the wireless instructions. Then Mr Powell moved on to a detailed examination of the claims about mobile labs, telling council members - with a line worthy of Harrison Ford: "Let me take you inside that intelligence file." The labs were moved around by road and rail to evade detection, he said.

One defector, a chemical engineer, currently hiding abroad in fear of death at the hands of Saddam's agents, had told them of their assembly, and given details of an accident in 1988 in which 12 technicians died.

Three other sources had given similar information, leading to the assumption there were 18 mobile labs. The screen showed drawings, exhibit 6, of what they looked like.

Iraq also had programmes to modify fuel tanks on jets, he said, as we were treated to a video of a jet taken in the early 1990s spraying the ground.

Mr Powell listed the stocks UN weapons inspectors said had not been accounted for and said: "We have evidence these weapons existed, we don't have evidence they were destroyed. That is what we are waiting for."

Finally, Mr Powell showed a picture of a missile stand taken in April last year with an exhaust vent for a rocket much bigger than permitted, and a photograph of the red trace made by an unmanned drone that had been tested on June 27th by being flown round and round for 500 kilometres, but 150 was the permitted limit.

Mr Powell completed his presentation by claiming, "Iraq harbours a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda lieutenant," but this time there were no intercepts or spy pictures.

In the end, all the evidence Mr Powell presented was circumstantial. "Intelligence is not evidence," one former inspector said. It had to be taken on trust. As the Secretary of State had said before coming to the UN, there was no "smoking gun".

There were, however, so many elements in the presentation that it made a considerable impression, not just on the chamber but on US television commentators, who unanimously hailed it afterwards as proof of what Mr Powell called a "nexus of poison and terror" in Iraq. Even UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who is against ending inspections, said after he left the chamber that it was a "strong presentation".

The reactions of the other council members were predictable: Britain called it a "most powerful and authoritative" case and France called for more time. The Iraqi ambassador, given special permission to speak, said under Powell's cold stare, that the allegations were baseless and made just to "bolster the case for war".

The US senior diplomat received congratulations as he left the chamber.

The initial reaction was that he had made a strong case, not just to the council but to a second important audience, the American public. The message for Saddam Hussein, said a Western diplomat in the scrum at the stake-out, was, "Beware the ides of March".

The Americans are on the road to war within weeks, he said, "there is no turning back".