The stormy confrontation is legendary in Washington. At a crisis session in the windowless White House Situation Room, Gen Colin Powell argued vehemently against US military intervention to end the siege of Sarajevo in 1993.
"None of the available options is guaranteed to change Serb behaviour," he warned. "And what's the political objective? What's the exit strategy?"
A visibly frustrated Madeleine Albright, then United Nations ambassador retorted: "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?"
The exchange captures the essence of Powell's philosophy - and the deep differences between the current and future secretaries of state in both style and substance.
"Of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most" is a favorite quote from the Greek historian Thucydides that Powell kept under the glass on his desk at the Pentagon.
"As an old infantryman, he's willing to get into foxholes when there's a crisis, but he'll do it only in context of a grand strategy, a moral principle and, most of all, an exit strategy," says Kenneth M. Duberstein, President Reagan's chief of staff and Powell's closest political adviser. "He picks his battles. And he does nothing in halfway measures."
The so-called Powell doctrine was evident after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Powell favored economic sanctions rather than firepower to force President Saddam Hussein's withdrawal. He opposed military might unless victory was guaranteed, meaning an unprecedented campaign at unprecedented expense for a regional war.
But as force became the favoured option, he crafted Operation Desert Storm and persuaded the Bush administration to deploy half a million troops from 31 nations - producing a rout that, in turn, propelled him to unusual prominence for a military figure.
Joining the army in 1958 was a turning point in Powell's life. He found a job that was "honourable and useful" and that brought benefits "beyond my wildest hopes", Powell recalled in his autobiography, My American Journey.
He won his army commission a mere decade after President Truman issued an executive order to integrate America's military. During training at Fort Benning, he was refused service at Georgia diners and bars because of his race.
Another turning point was a White House fellowship in 1972-73 which connected him with Washington power-brokers including former Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger and former National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci.
"He worked well with the military and civilian sides of the Pentagon and at meetings was better prepared and knew more about the agenda than anyone else," Weinberger said. "As a result, he always had substantial influence on the outcome."
In many ways, Powell's biography makes him a logical choice for secretary of State. He has served in the other top national security jobs. He ran the Pentagon, which dwarfs the State Department in staff and budget.
In other ways, he does not fully fit the mold. "I wasn't hired to be a grand strategist. Nor is that my background," he told the Los Angeles Times after he became President Reagan's national security adviser.
One of the first challenges he faces is what to do about an old enemy who helped make him an American hero - Iraqi dictator Hussein.
"Powell is one of the primary reasons we still have Saddam, not because we didn't push all the way to Baghdad, which we never had a mandate to do. Powell was one of those who believed we'd destroyed or weakened the Republican Guard enough to eliminate it as a threat.
"He also calculated that any military so heavily defeated would turn on its leadership," says a senior US intelligence official involved in the Gulf War who has requested anonymity. "On both counts, he was wrong. Very wrong."
Powell has faced criticism on other issues too. During the Iran-Contra scandal, he was third on a list of 16 people who knew about the secret 1986 sale of missiles to Iran, according to the Tower Commission, which investigated the scandal.
In the inquiry, special prosecutor Lawrence E. Walsh scolded Powell for "misleading" testimony that could have been used "to impeach his credibility".
Powell has also come under fire for his position on Bosnia. Just who was right in that stormy 1993 confrontation with Madeleine Albright will long be debated.
For two years, the United States did not intervene - until the situation deteriorated and ethnic cleansing became so widespread that inaction became politically and strategically unsustainable. And once involved in Bosnia, Washington found it difficult not to get involved in Kosovo, another by-roduct of Yugoslavia's disintegration. US troops are still in the Balkans. But Slobodan Milosevic has been forced from power and a democratically elected president installed in Belgrade.
Even critics of his record concede that there are few people with as much foreign policy experience as the general, who dealt with 28 crises during his four years as Pentagon chief.
Powell acknowledges the enormous changes that have occurred since he worked in the last Bush administration. For the first time, America does not face an enemy that challenges either the US political or economic systems, he said in the keynote address to this summer's Republican National Convention.
He warned instead of "sick nations" continuing their quest for the "fool's gold" of tyranny and weapons of mass destruction. Powell's autobiography provides insight into how he likes to operate. He criticised the Clinton administration for discussions that "meander like graduate school bull sessions or think-tank seminars". And he expressed shock when a subordinate of National Security Adviser Anthony Lake argued with his boss in front of others.
Bush on Saturday compared Powell to one of the latter's heroes, Gen George Marshall. "I would say of Gen Powell what Harry Truman said of Gen Marshall: `He is a tower of strength and common sense,' " the President-elect enthused.