FINDINGS:Report critical of soldiers and orders they acted upon,
writes
DAN KEENAN,
Northern News Editor, in Derry
LORD SAVILLE has found that all those shot dead or injured on Bloody Sunday in the Bogside in January 1972 were innocent.
His report, which runs to 10 volumes and 5,000 pages, is deeply critical of the British paratroopers deployed in Derry that day and of the orders given to them by their commanding officer. It effectively sets aside the findings of the Widgery report, released amid a storm of controversy just months after the killings.
Col Derek Wilford, who gave the orders to mount an incursion into the Bogside to confront an anti-internment march, should not have done so, Saville reports. Col Wilford here deliberately disobeyed Brigadier MacLellan or failed to recognise the limits of what he was allowed to do.
The report concludes that Col Wilford “wanted to demonstrate that the way to deal with rioters in Londonderry was not for soldiers to shelter behind barricades like (as he put it) ‘Aunt Sallies’ while being stoned . . . but instead to go aggressively after rioters as he and his soldiers had been doing in Belfast”.
With two possible exceptions, the report states, “none of the firing by the soldiers of support company was aimed at people posing a threat of death or serious injury”. The soldiers’ behaviour before a banned parade of civil rights marchers was marked by “a serious and widespread loss of fire discipline among the soldiers of Support Company”.
Soldiers had gone into the Bogside probably in the mistaken belief that among the marchers were republican paramilitaries responding to the presence of paratroopers. The first shots fired by the army reinforced this belief.
“Soldiers reacted by losing their self-control and firing themselves, forgetting or ignoring their instructions and training, and failing to satisfy themselves that they had identified targets posing a threat of causing death or serious injury,” Saville reports.
The report details the events leading up to the shootings on January 30th, 1972, and the belief that had formed in the minds of senior army figures that the only way to deal effectively with lawlessness on the streets of Belfast and Derry was to shoot selected ringleaders after the issue of clear warnings.
It refers to the ban on marches in place at the time and the decision of march organisers to ignore it by staging a protest in the city on that day. The British army feared such a significant flouting of the ban would provoke greater unrest and violence from unionists.
Derry’s local police commander, Chief Supt Lagan, favoured allowing the march to reach its intended destination at the city’s Guildhall. However, senior army figures believed the march would be too large to be controlled effectively by the RUC.
They planned to allow the march to remain within nationalist areas of Derry, but to prevent it from reaching the city centre.
Saville reports that Gen Robert Ford, the commander of land forces in Northern Ireland at the time, ordered 1st battalion, the parachute regiment, to Derry to mount an arrest operation in the event of the expected rioting that would follow the illegal march.
Brig Patrick MacLellan was responsible for the detailed plans to deal with the march. his operation order provided for the use of the paras as the arrest force, “but [he] also made clear in express terms that any arrest operation was to be mounted only on the orders of the Brigadier”.
Knowing that the march would be stopped before its destination, the organisers opted for a different route, which brought it into confrontation with the army at barrier 14 at William Street. Trouble broke out and soldiers responded with so-called baton rounds, water cannon and CS gas.
The report says the first shots were fired by two members of machine gun platoon, which injured two civilians. This was followed by the shooting of a rifle by two members of the Official IRA.
“Two Official IRA members had gone to a pre-arranged sniping position in order to fire at the soldiers: and probably did so when an opportunity presented itself rather than because two civilians had been injured,” Saville concludes.
The report details the orders given by Brig MacLellan and his concern that soldiers did not mount a chase of marchers along the street, mixing peaceful protesters with those engaged in stone-throwing. Col Wilford did not comply and deployed support company, which he did not have the authority to do.
Saville concludes the firing of the first shots by support company “cannot be justified” and that consequent firing of more than 100 shots in a 10-minute period in the Rossville Street area, Glenfada Park and Abbey Park wounded or killed the civilians.
One of these, Jim Wray, was shot twice, the second time probably while he lay mortally wounded on the ground. Another shot struck and killed Gerard McKinney before striking and mortally wounding Gerald Donaghy. Other victims were shot as they ran away from the soldiers.
As far as possible, the report details which soldiers, identified only by letters, were responsible for which deaths and injuries.
“In our view, none of these soldiers fired in the belief that he had or might have identified a person in possession of or about to use bombs or firearms. William McKinney and Jim Wray were both shot in the back and one of the other casualties (with the possible exception Daniel Gillespie) appears to have been facing the soldiers when shot,” the report states.
There was also no justification for shooting civilians as they lay injured on the ground.