An appeal against a £300,000 libel damages award to the Labour Party president, Mr Proinsias De Rossa, was dismissed by four to one at the Supreme Court yesterday.
In the dissenting judgment, Mrs Justice Denham found the award excessive and favoured giving guidelines to juries on damages. On the basis of reasonableness and proportionality, she would reduce it to £150,000.
Independent Newspapers plc had appealed against a High Court jury award to Mr De Rossa two years ago, for an article by Eamon Dunphy in the Sunday Independent of December 13th, 1992.
Giving the majority Supreme Court judgment, the Chief Justice, Mr Justice Hamilton, said he was not prepared to alter the traditional guidelines to be given to a jury for assessing of damages in cases of this nature.
During the appeal hearing last December, Independent Newspapers had argued that juries in libel trials should be referred to appropriate levels of damages for pain and suffering awarded in personal injuries cases by the superior courts, and to libel awards.
The Chief Justice - with whose judgment Mr Justice Barrington, Mr Justice Murphy and Mr Justice Lynch agreed - said the jury had found the words complained of by Mr De Rossa meant he was involved in or tolerated serious crime and personally supported anti-Semitism and violent communist oppression.
If those allegations were true, he added, Mr De Rossa was guilty of conduct which was not only likely to bring him into disrepute with right-minded people but was such as to render him unsuitable for public offices. No more serious allegations could be made against a politician such as Mr De Rossa.
Having regard to the serious nature of the libel, its potential impact on Mr De Rossa's career and other considerations, it appeared the jury would have been justified in "going to the top of the bracket and awarding as damages the largest sum that could fairly be regarded as compensation".
A fundamental principle of compensatory damages was that the award must always be reasonable and fair, duly correspond with the injury suffered and not be disproportionate with it. He was not satisfied the award went beyond what a reasonable jury applying the law to all the relevant considerations could reasonably have awarded or was disproportionate to the injury suffered.
Earlier, the Chief Justice said two issues arose on the appeal - whether the damages awarded were excessive and whether the directions given to the jury by the trial judge for assessing damages in such cases were adequate. If not, what directions should be given to the jury on how they should approach the assessment of damages in defamation cases.
The newspaper conceded that in his charge to the jury the trial judge followed the general practice in such cases of confining his directions to a statement of general principles, eschewing any specific guidance on the appropriate level of general damages.
The Chief Justice said he was satisfied even a guideline of figures would constitute an unjustifiable invasion of the province or domain of the jury.
The assessment of damages in a defamation action in the High Court was always a matter for the jury. But while he was not prepared to alter the traditional guidelines for juries assessing damages in libel cases, that did not mean the discretion of the jury was limitless. Damages awarded by a jury must be fair and reasonable and were subject to a right of appeal. Mrs Justice Denham said it was open to the court, in principle, to provide guidelines on the charges to be given by a judge to a jury in libel cases.
Guidelines on levels of damages given by a judge would aid the administration of justice, give relevant information and aid comparability and consistency in decision-making, she said.
It had long been considered that the issue of damages in a libel case was quintessentially a jury function and its discretion should not be unfettered. However, in other jurisdictions in recent times judges had determined on a more active approach, Mrs Justice Denham said. In general, this changed approach had arisen to aid consistency in the administration of justice.