Last September a report from the Irish Refugee Council identified serious shortcomings in the process of dealing with refugee-status applications.
In a second report, the council has found that an accelerated procedure, where applications are dismissed as "manifestly unfounded" has been extended far beyond the exceptions provided for in international law.
The study of 65 cases was conducted by UCC law lecturer Ms Siobhβn Mullaly and solicitor Ms Sheila McGovern. It led them to recommend the discontinuation of the "manifestly unfounded" ground for refusing asylum.
The problems they identified are legion but perhaps the most fundamental is that the whole system is pervaded by what they call a "culture of disbelief", where it is assumed the applicant is a "bogus" refugee. This runs counter to both the letter and spirit of international law, which stresses that the benefit of the doubt should go to the applicant, frequently traumatised by his or her experiences.
Examples of the "culture of disbelief" abound in the case-histories published. They included that of a Nigerian man who had converted from Islam to Christianity, and whose father, an influential man, threatened to kill him. The notes refer to his "purported conversion to Christianity", though he was not questioned on his religious beliefs, and pointed to an apparent inconsistency in the amounts he said he paid for his passage. In fact one was exactly twice the other, referring to the amount paid for him and his brother.
The application of a Romanian woman who was abused and raped by her husband, and whose reports to police resulted only in more beatings from her husband, was also found to be "manifestly unfounded", despite human-rights reports documenting serious abuses of women's rights in Romania.
The report also found that only 3 per cent of applicants had any legal advice before their interview, that a "manifestly unfounded" decision could be made at any time, even before there was any interview, and that additional reasons for this decision could be inserted into the notes without the applicant having an opportunity to rebut them.
Problems identified in the earlier report re-appear, including inadequate translation facilities and, frequently, ignorance of and insensitivity to the political and cultural backgrounds of applicants' countries of origin.
The report suggests that those making decisions should be qualified in law or a social science.
In general, the authors comment, "a desire for speed and efficiency has won out over commitments to natural justice and fair procedures".
But they point out that the accelerated procedures do increase efficiency at all, as they lead to a high number of decisions being overturned on appeal, and to the generation of costly and time-consuming judicial reviews.
This report once again raises questions as to what the purpose of the asylum applications process is - to fulfil our international obligations to offer asylum to those fleeing persecution or to protect the State from aspiring illegal immigrants.
It has been argued that the two go together, but in reality assuming all asylum-seekers are potential illegal immigrants leads to a diminution of the rights of those needing protection.