In his last months in office, Harold Wilson revealed the extent of his exhaustion, frustration and sense of defeat at the political problems posed by Northern Ireland. In an "Apocalyptic Note for the Record", contained in a top secret file, the British prime minister entertained the fantasy of an independent Northern Ireland, perhaps suggesting that his mental faculties were on the wane.
A combination of recent events and past experiences weighed heavily on Wilson's mind in January 1976, just two months before he was to leave office. Even by the standards of "the Troubles", it was a particularly brutal start to the new year. On January 4th, loyalists murdered two Catholics at a farmhouse in Co Armagh and another three Catholic men in Co Down.
The following day, republicans stopped a minibus and murdered 10 Protestant workers at Kingsmill, Co Armagh, on their way home from work, sparing only the Catholic driver.
In a memorandum for "limited circulation", written on January 10th, Wilson argued that the British government had to "face up to a situation where Northern Ireland becomes ungovernable", either because "terrorism amounting to civil war supervenes" or if industrial action, "directed to constitutional pre-emption occurs on a scale where the civil power becomes impotent". Wilson was clearly still deeply scarred by the Ulster Worker's Council strike of 1974 which had brought down powersharing institutions in Northern Ireland.
But in this document he went much further, entertaining a scenario where Ulster loyalists declare a "Unilateral Declaration of Independence", following the precedent of Rhodesia.
Even if an independent Ulster professed allegiance to the queen, this would not necessarily entail that she would qualify for the Commonwealth.
Indeed, he suspected that its leaders would not even apply for membership, "since those in charge would be, by their very actions", rejecting contact with "the outer, civilised world".
Moreover, in a scathing commentary on Ulster loyalism, Wilson suggested that, "quite apart from a possible unwillingness on the part of the crown to accept the headship of such an unruly mob", that those in control of Northern Ireland "would be so inward looking that they would not even ask for the queen's continued sovereignty". This would be a damning verdict on the claim to the name "loyalist". They would prove, "as their actions have long suggested, that they are loyal to no monarch except a long-dead Dutchman [William of Orange], who on political grounds would find it hard to assume the operative position of head of state".
In legal terms, the New Ulster that Wilson envisaged would almost certainly be a republic. It was certainly unlikely that it would achieve recognition from the United Nations. And while he did not think that direct UN sanctions were likely, he was not averse to using Westminster to "drive them into diplomatic oblivion".
"They could well exist as a pariah state", with serious consequences for trade, navigation and freedom of movement for its citizens.
One consequence, Wilson admitted, might be "Ulster-inspired terrorism" directed at Britain and possibly even emanating from sympathetic areas such as Glasgow and Liverpool. But at least Britain would no longer have to put up with the "inordinate financial position we have maintained at the expense of the taxpayers for maintaining unemployment and unearned social standards for the people of Ulster".
In a caveat at the end of the document, he reassured those who would read it that he was only considering these pos- sibilities, in case it became impossible to manage "the purblind fanaticism" of those who have "the bit between their teeth". The purpose in forwarding this memorandum was to "sound a warning" rather than "attempt to prescribe" a solution. Nonetheless, a small number of officials who saw it moved swiftly and decisively to allay the Wilson's more far-fetched concerns. "Negotiated independence", wrote Frank Cooper, head of the NIO, was only ever really discussed by "mavericks and loners".