Business, the parties, FitzGerald and forum all played key roles

Deaglán de Bréadún, Foreign Affairs Correspondent, looks at the scope and strategy of the Yes campaign.

Deaglán de Bréadún, Foreign Affairs Correspondent, looks at the scope and strategy of the Yes campaign.

Success has many parents, they say, but failure is an orphan. It's said that Mr Bertie Ahern and Mr Brian Cowen felt bereft and friendless when they had to go and face our EU partners after the debacle of the first Nice referendum in June 2001.

Cowen in particular had the unenviable task of reassuring his counterparts from the candidate countries that, although Ireland had voted No, this did not mean we were pulling up the drawbridge on countries which had suffered so long under communist dictatorship.

What Government insiders call "a period of reflection" followed the initial rejection of Nice: "We just left it alone." Certain lessons were obvious from the referendum defeat. There had to be a proper debate on European issues throughout Irish society, involving both sides, so that widespread misconceptions and misunderstandings could be dispelled. To this end, the National Forum on Europe (originally a Labour Party idea) was established under Senator Maurice Hayes.

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Although most of the media ignored it as stoutly as they had ignored the first referendum, the forum drew sizeable crowds to its meetings at different regional locations. Perhaps the forum can claim some of the credit for the fact that, this time around, nothing was heard of the anti-Nice slogan, "If you don't know, vote No."

There was also a decision to put the Nice Treaty in the broader context of our overall relationship with the EU, rather than engage in ideological mud-wrestling with the No side about the minutiae of the text. People needed to be told that a second No vote would mark a dramatic turn in our EU involvement and that, instead of being regarded as near-exemplary members, we would now be lumped with the UK as part of the "awkward squad".

Neutrality had been a major concern for No voters in the first poll and those fears had to be addressed. Contact was made with the other EU capitals about methods of reassuring people that voting for Nice would not result in their sons and daughters becoming cannon-fodder on some far foreign field.

There were discussions also with Labour, which had a particular interest in this issue. Labour wanted strong constitutional protection in this respect.

The end-products of these deliberations were: (1) The joint declaration of EU member-states, affirming that Nice was not a threat to our neutrality. (2) An additional sub-section for inclusion in the Constitution, guaranteeing another referendum before Ireland could join an EU mutual defence arrangement. Ideally Labour people would have liked to exclude NATO membership also but it was pointed out that the Nice Treaty did not involve joining NATO.

Another issue that had to be dealt with was the "democratic deficit" between the EU and mainstream political debate in this country. Legislation proposed by Labour for enhanced parliamentary scrutiny was adopted and provision was also made for the European Affairs Committee to quiz Ministers ahead of meetings in Brussels.

Then there was the economic factor. "We had to attack the superficial attraction of the idea that more EU members meant fewer benefits for us," says one insider. "A larger EU is good for an export-oriented economy, so enlargement is therefore a good thing."

When this autumn came around, there was a feeling in Government circles that the issues had been thoroughly ventilated in the forum and that a short campaign, tied to the broader timetable for EU enlargement, was the best option.

The feeling was, "Let's go at it and put in a big effort."

The decision of the main opposition parties not to take advantage of Government difficulties was also helpful.

Labour was focused on its leadership contest anyway but Fine Gael resisted the temptation to get in a rabbit-punch at Mr Ahern over cutbacks and the state of the economy.

As director of the Fine Gael election campaign, former Taoiseach Mr John Bruton worked alongside new party leader Enda Kenny as well as TDs and MEPs, organising some 20 meetings throughout the State.

These were arranged as early as July, working on the assumption - eventually proven correct - that the referendum would be held the week before the Brussels EU summit in October.

The posters, Europe. Yes. Let's talk about it, adopted a soft-shoe approach. "We were anxious to get people in, we didn't want to be too directive," Mr Bruton recalls.

The business community, in particular, felt shocked after the first vote. We still might be sporting European footwear, but the shoes had lost their shine.

Factors such as influence and goodwill seem a little woolly in debate but can be very real if you are sitting across the table from an east European business person, trying to get a contract.

IBEC took a unanimous decision last March to have a "full-blown" drive for a Yes vote with a strong element of outdoor advertising. It was an unprecedented campaign for the employers' organisation, with a budget of €500,000 raised from its corporate and semi-State member firms. A number of advertising agencies were invited to make a pitch and the contract went to the Dublin-based DDFH&B.

"We were anxious to have an independent campaign focused on business issues," says Ms Maria Cronin, IBEC's director of strategy and EU affairs. Vote Yes to Jobs for Them was the main message on the billboards beside pictures of two winsome children. A special website, www.nicetreaty.ie, was set up and explanatory brochures distributed to member-firms.

There was little or no public involvement in the first Nice campaign. Immediately after the result, a young Trinity College Dublin graduate, Mr Adrian Langan, received four e-mails from Polish friends, each asking why Ireland had apparently rejected enlargement.

Mr Langan says he contacted six Irish friends and a new organisation, Ireland for Europe, was born the day after the first referendum defeat.

Here were the young professionals seeking to protect what they saw as the gains for Ireland in the EU. Another example of this was the group, IFSC for Yes, based in Dublin's International Financial Services Centre, which produced a striking poster with the simple slogan: Yes. It matters.

Realising that Europe was much too important to be left to politicians, another group came together on the initiative of Prof Brigid Laffan, a leading academic in the field of European studies, to discuss how civil society could contribute to the Nice campaign.

The Irish Alliance for Europe emerged, with Ireland for Europe among its affiliated organisations and Mr Adrian Langan as campaign director.

Inevitably, IBEC had hoovered up much of the funding from the business community but money was raised in a series of four breakfasts at €200 a plate, with the former Taoiseach Dr Garret FitzGerald, Mr John Hume, President of the European Parliament Mr Pat Cox and Ireland's European Commissioner Mr David Byrne as guest-speakers.

Now in his late 70s, Dr FitzGerald launched himself into the Alliance's street campaign with a vigour that belied his calendar age.

Public reaction when he canvassed outside the Ireland-Georgia soccer match showed, in the words of one activist, that "Garret was our trump card".

Meanwhile, Fianna Fáil had recovered from a tough general election and was gearing itself for the Nice campaign. TDs were appointed directors of elections in their constituencies, so there could no evading responsibility if the result went wrong.

A campaign centre and press office was set up in Dublin's Pembroke Street with Mr P.J. Mara heading a team that included party wunderkind, Mr Peter MacDonagh, general secretary Mr Martin Macken and European Parliament press officer, Mr Dave Harmon.

Publication of the Flood Tribunal Report, with an unfavourable mention of Mr Mara, brought an immediate demand from the Greens for Mr Mara's head and he stepped down next day, to be replaced by Mr Cowen.

The Fianna Fáil "war room" has a well-deserved reputation for efficiency, aggression and hard work but, contrary to some reports, it had nothing whatsoever to do with this newspaper's expose of No to Nice Campaign leader Mr Justin Barrett's contacts with German and Italian parties generally regarded as neo-fascist.

The story originally surfaced in a Sunday Mirror report drawn from left-wing and anti-fascist sources. Despite a threat of legal action from Mr Barrett's solicitors, The Irish Times succeeded in confirming, without any assistance or prompting from Fianna Fáil, that he had indeed attended meetings of the far-right National Democratic Party (NPD) in Germany and Forza Nuova in Italy.

For fear of demonstrations of one sort or another, Fianna Fáil was discreet about its daily news conferences, the time and location of which were only notified to journalists a few hours beforehand.

The party's Minister of State for European Affairs, Mr Dick Roche had borne the brunt of the Yes campaign over the summer and he was now supplemented by Mr Brian Lenihan and Mr Seamus Brennan whose more quiet spoken demeanour played into the party's strategy of highlighting the dangers of a No vote without being accused of scaremongering.

Fianna Fáil had spent some €60,000 in the first Nice campaign, now it had a budget of €500,000.

It printed and distributed more than 1.3 million pieces of literature: leaflet, banners and posters.

The organisation was mobilised around the State although it never reached the level of activity of a general election. Immigration was the dominant issue in the early stages, milked for all it was worth by an unusual alliance of the conservative Mr Barrett and liberal academic Dr Anthony Coughlan.

Fianna Fáil were genuinely worried by it and senior party figures still believe it could have sunk the Nice Treaty. Fears of a "flood" of immigrants proved surprisingly prevalent on the ground but the issue faded somewhat, partly due to Government statements that work permits could still be demanded from citizens of the new member-states if there was an unfavourable economic situation.

Neutrality also proved surprisingly resilient as a public concern, despite the Seville Declaration of the EU and the new subsection in the proposed amendment. But as polling day loomed, the omens for the Yes side were promising.