These are key findings of the Butler Report into the gathering and use of intelligence by the British government in the run-up to the war in Iraq.
In March 2002 the intelligence available was "insufficiently robust" to prove Iraq was in breach of UN resolutions.
Validation of intelligence sources since the war has "thrown doubt" on a high proportion of these sources.
Some of the intelligence about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was "seriously flawed" and "open to doubt".
The Joint Intelligence Committee should not have included the "45-minute" claim in the Iraq dossier without stating what exactly it referred to.
However, no evidence was found of "deliberate distortion" of the intelligence material, or of "culpable negligence".
The language of the government's dossier on Iraq's weapons may have left readers with the impression that there was "fuller and firmer" intelligence behind its judgments than was the case.
Mr Tony Blair's statement to MPs on the day the dossier was published may have reinforced this impression.
The judgments in the dossier went to the "outer limits", although not beyond the intelligence available.
Making it public that the Joint Intelligence Committee had authorship of the Iraq dossier was a "mistaken judgment".
This resulted in more weight being placed on the intelligence than it could bear.
John Scarlett, the head of the JIC in the run-up to the Iraq war, should not resign.
It would be a "rash person" who claimed that stocks of biological or chemical weapons would never be found in Iraq.
No evidence was found that the motive of the British government for initiating military action in Iraq was securing continued access to oil supplies.
The report raised concern about the "informality and circumscribed character" of the government's policy-making procedures towards Iraq.