EUROPE:Not surprisingly, the Euro-scepticism of the Tories is seen as a threat by many in Brussels, writes ARTHUR BEESLEY
BRUSSELS IS watching the Westminster election closely. As David Cameron gains strength in the polls, the prospect of the Tories taking command in London fills many here with unease.
The simple reason for this, of course, is the Euro-scepticism that dominates his party. At this stage, it’s still far from a done deal that “l’Aristo”, as Le Monde calls Cameron, will take Downing Street. He may also have to share power with Nick Clegg, leader of the Liberal Democrats.
While Britain’s voting system could also hand most seats to Gordon Brown against the run of play, officials and diplomats in the EU bureaucracy are still bracing themselves for change.
If Labour never came good on Tony Blair’s promise to put Britain at the centre of Europe, Cameron is seen to lead a party whose questioning stance could present serious political problems in Brussels. Already, for example, he has withdrawn from the centre- right European Peoples’ Party, the dominant faction in the European Parliament, a manoeuvre which disconnected the Tories from their alignment with the parties of German chancellor Angela Merkel and French president Nicolas Sarkozy.
Although Cameron and his would-be foreign secretary William Hague say they are not angling for a “bust-up” in Brussels, they would not have to be particularly belligerent to make life difficult. With many in last year’s crop of new Tory MEPs decidedly on the sceptical side, Cameron’s Westminster candidates are perceived to be no different.
This matters because of the basic contours of Cameron’s European policy, which calls for the repatriation to Britain of social and employment powers and referendums on any future treaty changes. In addition, key debates in the near- and medium- term are riddled with potential for strife.
Not long ago, for example, Brown’s resistance to new regulations on hedge funds led EU finance ministers to postpone until after the election their decision on new financial rules. If Cameron prevails on Thursday, it would be for him to call the next move. The perception is that the Tories will always side with the City on business issues, but they would be swimming against a very strong European tide.
This early test would be little, however, to a potential confrontation over the “rebate” Britain receives from the EU budget to compensate for its low agricultural subsidies.
As member states make ready for the negotiation of the EU budget for the years from 2014 to 2020, everyone is looking closely at everyone else. Cameron would defend the rebate, but any demand he makes to take powers to London from Brussels could lead to counter-claims for its dilution.
This would present difficulties for Cameron, given the weakness in Britain’s finances.
Although the fiscal challenge confronting the next British government will be daunting, high-level sources in Brussels are less than convinced about the calibre of Cameron’s would-be chancellor, George Osborne.
Indeed some here would prefer to see Hague in Number 11. Hague is seen as a rather more substantial figure. Wishing him into the finance portfolio also reflects a desire to limit the Euro- sceptic influence he would exercise over foreign policy.
For all that, Cameron is fighting now to avoid the spectre of a hung parliament. This flows from the rise of Clegg, a former EU official whose pro-European stance ensures many in Brussels see him as “one of us”.
Europe would divide the Tories and the Lib Dems in any joint administration, but the schism would be secondary to Clegg’s totemic demand for reform of Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system. In his hour of need, Cameron may have to concede electoral reform.
It is not possible, however, to see the Lib Dems forcing a European conversion on the Tories. Europe could thus become a lightning rod for the political tensions that surface in joint government, tensions that could well be magnified by Tory attachment to single-party government.
Even if Cameron forms a government on his own and even if he at first adopts a conciliatory stance with his EU partners, it would be open to him to drum up rhetoric and gamesmanship over Europe as a lever to appease any internal dissent. The weaker his numbers in parliament, the more likely that would be, a minority government being the most fertile ground for Euro-sceptics.
Cameron started the campaign in a strong position to unseat Brown. That is still not assured, even at this late stage, for Clegg could determine Brown’s fate by aligning with Labour in return for the prime minister’s head.
Brown is not particularly popular in Brussels so his departure would not be mourned. However, there could well be a measure of relief in Brussels if Brown’s party survived.
In the final analysis, there is little appetite here for renewed bickering over the nature and reach of the European enterprise. Cameron revels in that kind of stuff, but it is only in office that his true colours would be shown.