US/IRAQ: In the event of war, Baghdad may have more cruise missiles fired at it in 48 hours than in the entire 1991 Gulf War, writes Timothy Garden
The politics require a short, successful, low casualty war to conquer Iraq. The optimists are looking to start the post-Saddam reconstruction six days after the military cross the start line. The pessimists remember the weary demoralising years of Vietnam. Mixed messages emerge from Washington about the military plan, and the unavailability of Turkey has reduced the options.
Civilian planners in the Pentagon claim the new technologies will allow them to win in very short order in a strategy of "shock and awe". Precision weapons are cheap and available. Mass attacks on key targets from the air should be possible with minimal collateral damage.
Mr Harlan Ullman, a Washington defence analyst, says an initial two-day barrage by cruise missiles and precision-guided bombs will be on a scale never seen before. More cruise missiles will land in Baghdad in 48 hours than were used in the whole 1991 Gulf war. At the same time, the army and marines would secure key sites throughout the country.
Counter-proposals come from the military planners. Gen Buster Glosson, who was the chief air planner for the last Gulf war, has warned that simultaneous air and ground war is fraught with dangers. Air operations to soften up resistance make for a much easier subsequent ground campaign. Not for the first time has Gen Glosson had to make this case. In August 1990, he recorded in his journal "need air campaign for 15 rounds not three; six days is dumb". Events proved him right. In the operation to free Kuwait, six weeks of air operations allowed a ground campaign to succeed in 100 hours. This time he predicts a 30-day campaign.
Twelve years on, the Iraqi forces are much weaker. Mr Donald Rumsfeld once said he took comfort from the thought that "if you think you have things under control, you're not going fast enough". The military are always more cautious than their political masters, but the operational approach to an Iraq war is not the time for major divisions on strategy.
It is easy to forget how large Iraq is: nearly twice the size of Britain. For an invasion over the next few weeks, it now seems likely that, among neighbouring states, only Kuwait will be available as a launch pad. Iran and Syria will not come to the assistance of the US. Jordan and Saudi Arabia cannot risk the reaction of their populations without direct UN authorisation of the action. Even Turkey seems unable to deliver on the complicated and expensive bargain that would have bought US basing rights. Cruise missiles can be launched from ships and submarines in the Gulf. Aircraft can come from carriers and bases more distant, but will require air refuelling support for the long flights.
The real difficulty will be deploying the land forces simultaneously over considerable distances in a hostile environment. The shock of the first waves of missile attacks may be great; but just as with an artillery barrage, it takes time to wear down an enemy. Last year one US analyst, Mr William Lind, said: "My worst-case scenario is that we go in through Kuwait so we have a single port of entry and a single line of communication and supply as we go down the Gulf. We get well into Iraq with a small army, our line of communication is cut, and our army is stranded."
Only time will tell whether the Pentagon technocrats or the military win the argument, and whether they are able to deliver on their promises. Already the expansion of no-fly zone offensive operations indicates military pressure to get essential combat air tasks under way if the war is to be short. It is unlikely that the British will have much influence on the plan, but Mr Tony Blair and Mr Geoff Hoon will have to be prepared to defend the consequent course of the battle. They will be extremely fortunate if it is as short as they hope.
Sir Timothy Garden is a former UK air marshal and was director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He is now visiting professor at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London