The Balkans war now seems to have spread to Washington itself. To be sure, the debate about the aims of the operation against Yugoslavia is still conducted in the time-honoured fashion of the American capital - unattributed leaks from "highly placed sources", unconvincing denials of internal rifts, and sensational interviews with retired military officers.
A new approach to the Balkans will emerge soon, if only because President Clinton knows NATO cannot function without a US lead. Yet the chances are that this new strategy will continue to fudge the distinction between the air campaign, which plainly does not work, and a ground offensive against Yugoslavia about which Clinton remains reluctant.
A debate between the President and his military commanders has been a constant feature of US history throughout this century; in this respect, therefore, the tussle over Balkans strategy is not novel. But there are some remarkable twists in the present story.
Traditionally, the State Department advocated negotiation and moderation, while the Pentagon suggested military solutions. In the case of Yugoslavia, however, the roles have been reversed. Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State, has been among the most hawkish members of the administration, while the country's top military brass has constantly opposed the operation.
The result has been an awkward compromise now threatening to crumble.
The military criticism at the weekend by Gen Colin Powell, the country's much-respected former commander, is compelling. NATO's politicians were warned from the start an air campaign alone could not achieve the alliance's objectives.
NATO hamstrung its military with a set of limited Yugoslav targets, carefully listed in order to avoid civilian casualties while maintaining the political consensus within a 19-member alliance.
More importantly, an enemy can only be persuaded to cave in if it knows the war will escalate relentlessly. By ruling out a ground offensive from the start, NATO granted President Milosevic the initiative. The Yugoslav dictator had every incentive to refuse to talk in the hope that sooner or later the air strikes against him will stop, leaving him with Kosovo still.
The much-vaunted "surgical strike" has turned into a war of attrition which can only be concluded with the utter destruction of Yugoslavia or a dishonourable peace deal brokered by the Russians. If President Clinton wants to avoid either outcome, the current US Chiefs of Staff argued in a letter leaked to the US press, he should decide on introducing ground forces soon.
Clinton's fear of a ground offensive is usually explained by the US aversion to military losses, the so-called "body-bags syndrome", which haunted the country's politicians since Vietnam. But the reasons for the White House's reluctance are more specific this time. A president determined to achieve clear-cut military objectives can commit massive US forces to a ground offensive; George Bush managed to achieve this earlier this decade in the Gulf.
However, the Yugoslav operation was planned while Clinton was still embroiled in his impeachment hearings. The President did nothing to prepare public opinion for what was about to unfold and, when fighting started, he reassured Americans the war will not be allowed to escalate.
The Republican-controlled Congress is determined to transform Kosovo into a test of Clinton's military leadership credentials. The opportunity to forge a national consensus over this issue was missed two months ago, and cannot be recreated.
Furthermore, the humanitarian crisis NATO pledged to avert happened. Reversing the mass expulsion of Albanians is an honourable task, but one which is more confused in nature and does not seem to elicit the same public support in the US. Ultimately, Clinton has calculated that a foreign policy triumph cannot guarantee his party's control of the White House after the next presidential elections, but a foreign policy defeat will most certainly bury Vice President Al Gore's electoral chances.
In short, the risks of a debacle from a ground operation are simply too high, while the potential electoral benefits remain too slim for comfort.
Anticipating this dilemma, Mr Tony Blair tried to find a compromise. Over the last few weeks he has suggested a ground force could be introduced into Kosovo but, miraculously, this force will not sustain many casualties because the Yugoslav forces will be weakened by months of air strikes. It was a clever idea, temptingly packaged in a military cliche under the name of a "semi-permissive environment".
The US military has refused to accept the concept, arguing that, if it is ordered to invade Yugoslav territory, it must do so fully prepared for lengthy fighting.
Jonathan Eyal is director of studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London.