Fundamental objectives
In the hope of strengthening its hand in its continuing dispute with Turkey over the Aegean, Greece had sought a commitment in the treaty to the defence of the territorial integrity of the Union, a commitment seen by the 14 other states as liable to embroil the Union in disputes in which it wanted as little part as possible.
For the four neutrals, Ireland included, such a clause would also have smacked of a mutual defence guarantee - something they are not yet ready for.
Maastricht defines the objective of the Union's foreign policy as "to safeguard the common values and the fundamental interests of the Union" .
Amsterdam adds to the list the safeguarding of the "integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter" , a formula seen by most EU diplomats as merely expressing in treaty form the reality that all member states are already bound by their UN obligations. No more.
United we stand . . .
The Treaty also strengthens the commitment of member states to act together internationally, even when they are not in agreement with a particular policy.
The member states "shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations" .
And Amsterdam for the first time makes provision for foreign and security policy decisions to be made by other than unanimous agreement.
The new treaty does so by distinguishing between, on the one hand, decisions on general principles and strategic decisions, still to be determined unanimously by heads of government, and, on the other, implementing decisions, which can be taken by qualified majority by ministers, as long as they are in line with the broad guidelines set by the heads of government.
A Defence Union?
Strong pressure from France, Germany and the Benelux countries to strengthen the treaty's commitment to a common defence was resisted by the neutrals, but also by Britain and Denmark who believed that such a move would undermine Nato.
Irish negotiators argued strongly that with the end of the Cold War Europe's security requirements had been fundamentally changed and could be met by giving the Union a role in peacekeeping, in effect an extension of the member states' obligations to the UN.
If it limited itself to that challenge there would be no problem for the neutrals in signing up to Amsterdam.
In the end the treaty does precisely that, refraining from any obligation to defend fellow member states if they come under attack, and it retains a formulation on defence which is largely indistinguishable from that in Maastricht although, controversially, it does allow the European Council - a summit of EU leaders - to take the issue further.
Amsterdam replaces the commitment to "the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence," with the commitment to "the progressive framing of a common defence policy . . . which might lead to a common defence should the European Council so decide" .
The meaning of the last six words, which emerged amid some confusion late in the final night of the treaty negotiations, is fiercely contested. EU-based diplomats insist that the formula simply reflects the reality that the European Council, acting unanimously, is the only body which can change the treaty.
Any move to a common defence would need, they say, to be enabled in new treaty language.
But Irish opponents of the treaty argue that the clause would allow for the establishment of a common defence without the further amendment of the treaty. That, in turn, they say, undermines the hold the Irish electorate has in preventing the Government from reneging on its twin pledges to keep Ireland out of defence alliances and to a referendum on any change in such a policy.
In order to reassure the neutrals, though "neutrality" dare not speak its name, Amsterdam does provide that "the policy of the Union . . . shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states" .
The treaty does, however, turn the Union for the first time from an exclusively political and economic power into a military one, defining its role, for the present, as involving only the so-called "Petersberg tasks" of "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking" .
The most controversial of these tasks is the latter which refers to missions like Somalia and the current Bosnian operation where UN-mandated troops have sought to enforce a peace by robust means instead of just keeping warring factions apart.
Attempts to include armaments policy as a core element in the Union's defence and security policy were watered down, largely at Irish insistence, to a bland restatement of the current reality. States may co-operate on the issue "as they consider appropriate"
Whither the WEU?
Without any military muscle of its own the Union will have to borrow assets from Nato - it will do so through the Western European Union (WEU) which will also plan and command missions on the Union's behalf. But the treaty, which emphasises that "the WEU is an integral the development of the EU" stops short of full-merger with the WEU.
"The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide"
Once again, the dread six words! (see under "A Defence Union?")
And "when the Union avails itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions . . . all member states shall be able to participate fully in the tasks in question"
A new capacity and coherence
In order to provide continuity and coherence in presentation and representation of the Union's foreign policy Amsterdam charges a new group with the job and creates a new policy and analysis unit to provide a collective means of assessing developments.
Under the old system a troika of the current, previous and future presidencies played the role of the Union's senior diplomatic representation. In future the Presidency will be assisted in traditional troika roles by a new foreign policy supremo, nicknamed "Mr CFSP" - the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers - and by the relevant Commissioner, and, if thought necessary, the next Presidency.
Member states also promise closer co-ordination in international fora and agree to abide by Union policy at such meetings. Where some member states are not represented, such as the Group of Seven or on the United Nations Security Council, those present promise to keep the others "fully informed"
Finding ways round the veto
Although decisions on foreign and security issues are usually taken by unanimity (see "A Defence Union?"), a new mechanism provides a way round traditional decision-making gridlock. A member state which is unhappy with a policy but does not want to go as far as blocking it can register its opposition by "constructive abstention".
"In that case it shall not be obliged to implement the decision but shall accept the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity the member state concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision" .
Nor will such countries be required to contribute financially to such operations which will be paid for by participants in proportion to their GNP.
If more than a third of the weighted votes on a decision represent abstentions, the decision shall not be adopted.
When decisions can normally be taken by QMV, such as those implementing strategic decisions, a member state can require such decisions to be taken by unanimity if the issue involves "important and stated reasons of national policy" .
The reference to "national policy" rather than the suggested "national interests" is an Irish contribution to the treaty and would allow Dublin to insist, for example, that its policy on East Timor should be taken into account even if not strictly speaking a direct "interest".
The overall formula, diplomats argue, should make it more difficult for individual states to hold issues to ransom over other unrelated disputes, an all-too-common practise.
External Economic Relations
The Treaty talks significantly failed to agree an extension of the Commission's right to speak for the Union, under mandate from Ministers, in international economic fora and on such trade matters as WTO talks on intellectual property, services and investment. But the treaty provides for such a mandate at some future date if the member states can agree on it unanimously.