Apart from the imposition of an oil embargo on Yugoslavia and the predictable reiteration of the war aims in Kosovo, the NATO summit which ended in Washington this weekend does not appear to have produced anything new.
But the alliance is actually in a good shape, and many of the issues which divided NATO member-states for years have been addressed on the battle grounds of Kosovo. But all the leaders who gathered in Washington know that the real test will arrive in the coming weeks.
Throughout the 1990s, NATO grappled with three fundamental questions: its purpose in a post-Cold War world, the role of the Europeans in a future security arrangement and the task of maintaining cohesiveness. Solutions to these various existential questions were found, but they were often unsatisfactory and theoretical.
NATO promised to be all things to all people, but it never managed to create a consensus over what crises it should tackle on its own, and what should properly be left to other institutions.
Originally, therefore, NATO leaders were looking forward to their Washington summit with trepidation: many of the unanswered questions of the last few years were going to be settled there in a package deal grandly entitled a "New Strategic Concept".
The package was more or less adopted, but it is largely irrelevant, for Slobodan Milosevic, the Yugoslav dictator, has succeeded in providing most of the answers.
For years, the Europeans (and particularly the French and Germans) insisted that they should be able to handle conflicts in which the security of their continent is threatened, but the US does not wish to become involved. But the Europeans never mustered the political courage to pay for the military capabilities required for such a structure, and the Americans - although supportive of Europe's efforts in principle - doubted their wisdom.
A compromise was found: the Europeans could borrow American equipment for future operations which they wished to mount.
The war in Yugoslavia shows that future conflicts may be regional, but they are not amenable to a purely European intervention. The distinguishing characteristic of the current Kosovo crisis is the level of co-ordination between Washington and its European partners. For neutral countries in Europe, the conclusion is inescapable: NATO is the only military structure in the near future.
The legal mandate for future NATO operations preoccupied alliance leaders for years. Some have argued that NATO could not act without a formal authorisation of the UN Security Council. However, reliance on such a mandate is tantamount to granting Russia and China an effective veto over the alliance.
But, yet again, the Yugoslav dictator provided the answer. Although the alliance will strive to respect international law, it will also refuse to allow Russia any veto and may undertake operations even without an explicit UN mandate.
NATO critics may suggest that this is tantamount to giving the alliance freedom to become the world's policemen. Hardly. It is difficult to conceive of a NATO role in the Middle East or further afield, simply because the positions of the Americans and the Europeans on other conflicts are so different.
So, is the news totally positive for NATO? Not quite. First there is the issue of absorbing the new member-states. Poland has proven to be a solid ally, but the Czechs and Hungarians remain wavering members.
At the same time, the two countries in the Balkans which desperately want to join NATO - Romania and Bulgaria - are still being kept out.
NATO has requested, and obtained, permission to fly over the air space of both countries. Romania and Bulgaria will continue to co-operate, but only if they can get a promise that they would ultimately be integrated into NATO. The Washington summit has fudged the issue of further enlargements, but this game cannot continue for long.
The second big question is future strategy in the Yugoslav war. The alliance can maintain its consensus as long as the policy of air strikes continues, but this unanimity may fray the moment the conflict either moves to a ground offensive or to a negotiated solution.
Any peace deal which results in Kosovo's division or a compromise over the ethnic Albanian refugees will be interpreted as a defeat for NATO. The best that can be said is that, even if the temptation to settle for something less than a total victory may exist, alliance leaders know that they cannot afford to take the risk of discrediting NATO.
But none of them can tell whether the political courage for a ground offensive will ever be found. And on this issue, the Washington summit remained predictably silent.
The author is director of studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London